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Abstract. Lattice-based group signature is an active research topic in
recent years. Since the pioneering work by Gordon, Katz and Vaikun-
tanathan (Asiacrypt 2010), eight other schemes have been proposed,
providing various improvements in terms of security, efficiency and func-
tionality. However, most of the existing constructions work only in the
static setting where the group population is fixed at the setup phase. The
only two exceptions are the schemes by Langlois et al. (PKC 2014) that
handles user revocations (but new users cannot join), and by Libert et
al. (Asiacrypt 2016) which addresses the orthogonal problem of dynamic
user enrollments (but users cannot be revoked).
In this work, we provide the first lattice-based group signature that
offers full dynamicity (i.e., users have the flexibility in joining and leav-
ing the group), and thus, resolve a prominent open problem posed by
previous works. Moreover, we achieve this non-trivial feat in a relatively
simple manner. Starting with Libert et al.’s fully static construction (Eu-
rocrypt 2016) - which is arguably the most efficient lattice-based group
signature to date, we introduce simple-but-insightful tweaks that allow
to upgrade it directly into the fully dynamic setting. More startlingly,
our scheme even produces slightly shorter signatures than the former,
thanks to an adaptation of a technique proposed by Ling et al. (PKC
2013), allowing to prove inequalities in zero-knowledge. The scheme sat-
isfies the strong security requirements of Bootle et al.’s model (ACNS
2016), under the Short Integer Solution (SIS) and the Learning With
Errors (LWE) assumptions.
Furthermore, we demonstrate how to equip the obtained group sig-
nature scheme with the deniability functionality in a simple way. This
attractive functionality, put forward by Ishida et al. (CANS 2016), en-
ables the tracing authority to provide an evidence that a given user is
not the owner of a signature in question. In the process, we design a
zero-knowledge protocol for proving that a given LWE ciphertext does
not decrypt to a particular message.
Keywords. lattice-based group signatures; full dynamicity; updatable
Merkle trees; deniability
1 Introduction
Group signature, introduced by Chaum and van Heyst [15], is a fundamental
anonymity primitive which allows members of a group to sign messages on behalf
of the whole group. Yet, users are kept accountable for the signatures they issue
since a tracing authority can identify them should the need arise. There have
been numerous works on group signatures in the last quarter-century.
Ateniese et al. [2] proposed the first scalable instantiation meeting the se-
curity properties that can be intuitively expected from the primitive, although
clean security notions were not available yet at that time. Bellare et al. [4] filled
this gap by providing strong security notions for static groups, in which the group
population is fixed at the setup phase. Subsequently, Kiayias and Yung [25] and
Bellare et al. [5] established the models capturing the partially dynamic setting,
where users are able to join the group at any time, but once they have done so,
they cannot leave the group. Sakai et al. [47] strengthened these models by sug-
gesting the notion of opening soundness, guaranteeing that a valid signature only
traces to one user. Efficient schemes satisfying these models have been proposed
in the random oracle model [43,17] and in the standard model [21,34].
One essential functionality of group signatures is the support for membership
revocation. Enabling this feature in an efficient manner is quite challenging, since
one has to ensure that revoked users are no longer able to sign messages and
the workloads of other parties (managers, non-revoked users, verifiers) do not
significantly increase in the meantime. Several different approaches have been
suggested [10,12,50,42,6] to address this problem, and notable pairing-based con-
structions supporting both dynamic joining and efficient revocation were given
in [40,33,32]. Very recently, Bootle et al. [7] pointed out a few shortcomings of
previous models, and put forward stringent security notions for fully dynamic
group signatures. They also demonstrated a construction satisfying these notions
based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, following a generic
transformation from a secure accountable ring signature scheme [8].
Another interesting functionality of group signatures that we consider in this
work is deniability, suggested by Ishida et al. [22]. It allows the tracing authority
to provide a digital evidence that a given group user did not generate a signa-
ture in question. In [22], Ishida et al. discussed various situations in which such
functionality helps to protect the privacy of users. For instance, suppose that
the entrace/exit control of a building is implemented using a group signature
scheme, and the police wants to check whether a suspect was in this building at
the time of a crime. If the police asks the tracing authority to reveal the signers
of all signatures generated during that time period, then this will seriously vio-
late the privacy of innocent users. In such situation, deniable group signatures
make it possible to prove that the signer of a given signature is not the suspect,
while still keeping the signer’s identity secret. As shown by Ishida et al. [22], the
main technical challenge towards realizing the deniability functionality consists
of constructing a zero-knowledge proof/argument that a given ciphertext does
not decrypt to a particular message. Such a mechanism is non-trivial to real-
ize in general, but Ishida et al. [22] managed to achieve it from pairing-based
assumptions.
For the time being, existing group signature schemes offering full dynamicity
and/or deniability all rely on number-theoretic assumptions which are vulnera-
ble to quantum attacks [48]. To avoid putting all eggs in one basket, it is thus
encouraging to consider instantiations based on alternative, post-quantum foun-
dations, e.g., lattice assumptions. In view of this, let us now look at the topic of
lattice-based group signatures.
Lattice-based group signatures. Lattice-based cryptography has been an
exciting research area since the seminal works of Regev [45] and Gentry et al. [19].
Along with other primitives, lattice-based group signature has received notice-
able attention in recent years. The first scheme was introduced by Gordon, Katz
and Vaikuntanathan [20] whose solution produced signature size linear in the
number of group users N . Camenisch et al. [13] then extended [20] to achieve
anonymity in the strongest sense. Later, Laguillaumie et al. [26] put forward the
first scheme with the signature size logarithmic in N , at the cost of relatively
large parameters. Simpler and more efficient solutions with O(logN) signature
size were subsequently given by Nguyen et al. [44] and Ling et al. [36]. Libert et
al. [30] obtained substantial efficiency improvements via a construction based on
Merkle trees which eliminates the need for GPV trapdoors [19]. More recently, a
scheme supporting message-dependent opening (MDO) feature [46] was proposed
in [31]. All the schemes mentioned above are designed for static groups.
The only two known lattice-based group signatures that have certain dy-
namic features were proposed by Langlois et al. [27] and Libert et al. [28]. The
former is a scheme with verifier-local revocation (VLR) [6], which means that
only the verifiers need to download the up-to-date group information. The lat-
ter addresses the orthogonal problem of dynamic user enrollments (but users
cannot be revoked). To achieve those partially dynamic functionalities, both of
the proposals have to incorporate relatively complicated mechanisms1 and both
heavily rely on lattice trapdoors.
The discussed above situation is somewhat unsatisfactory, given that the
full dynamicity feature is highly desirable in most applications of group signa-
tures (e.g., protecting the privacy of commuters in public transportation), and
it has been achieved based on number-theoretic assumptions. This motivates us
to work on fully dynamic group signatures from lattices. Besides, considering
that the journey to partial dynamicity in previous works [27,28] was shown not
easy, we ask ourselves an inspiring question: Can we achieve full dynamicity
with ease? Furthermore, given that deniability is an attractive and non-trivial
functionality [22], can we also realize it with ease in the context of lattice-based
group signatures? At the end of the day, it is good to solve an open research
1 Langlois et al. considered users’ “tokens” as functions of Bonsai signatures [14] and
associated them with a sophisticated revocation technique, while Libert et al. used a
variant of Boyen’s signature [9] to sign users’ public keys. Both underlying signature
schemes require long keys and lattice trapdoors.
question, but it would be even better and more exciting to do this in a simple
way. To make it possible, we will likely need some new and insightful ideas.
Our Results and Techniques. Our main contribution is the first fully dy-
namic group signature from lattices. The scheme satisfies the strong security
requirements put forward by Bootle et al. [7], under the Short Integer Solu-
tion (SIS) and the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumptions. As in all previous
lattice-based group signatures, our scheme is analyzed in the random oracle
model. Additionally, we incorporate the deniability functionality suggested by
Ishida et al. [22] into Bootle et al.’s model, and then demonstrate how to make
our fully dynamic group signature scheme deniable.
Scheme
Sig.
size
Group
PK size
Signer’s
SK size
Trap-
door?
Model
Extra info
per epoch
Denia-
bility
GKV [20] O˜(λ2·N) O˜(λ2·N) O˜(λ2) yes static NA ?
CNR [13] O˜(λ2·N) O˜(λ2) O˜(λ2) yes static NA ?
LLLS [26] O˜(λ·ℓ) O(λ2·ℓ) O˜(λ2) yes static NA ?
LLNW [27] O˜(λ·ℓ) O˜(λ2·ℓ) O˜(λ·ℓ) yes VLR
Sign: no
Ver: O˜(λ)·R
?
NZZ [44] O˜(λ+ℓ2) O˜(λ2·ℓ2) O˜(λ2) yes static NA ?
LNW [36] O˜(λ·ℓ) O˜(λ2·ℓ) O˜(λ) yes static NA ⋆
LLNW [30] O˜(λ·ℓ) O˜(λ2 + λ · ℓ) O˜(λ · ℓ) FREE static NA ⋆
LLM+ [28] O˜(λ·ℓ) O˜(λ2·ℓ) O˜(λ) yes
partially
dynamic
NA ⋆
LMN [31] O˜(λ·ℓ) O˜(λ2·ℓ) O˜(λ) yes MDO NA ?
Ours O˜(λ·ℓ) O˜(λ2 + λ · ℓ) O˜(λ) + ℓ FREE
fully
dynamic
Sign:
O˜(λ·ℓ)
Ver: O˜(λ)
yes
Table 1. Comparison of known lattice-based group signatures, in terms of efficiency
and functionality. The comparison is done based on two governing parameters: security
parameter λ and the maximum expected number of group users N = 2ℓ. As for the
scheme from [27], R denotes the number of revoked users at the epoch in question.
In the last column, “⋆” means that the respective scheme can directly achieve the
deniability feature via our technique, while “?” indicates that we do not know how to
do so for the respective scheme.
For a security parameter parameter λ and maximum expected number of
group users N , our scheme features signature size O˜(λ·logN) and group public
key size O˜(λ2 + λ · logN). The user’s secret key has bit-size O˜(λ) + logN . At
each epoch when the group information is updated, the verifiers only need to
download an extra O˜(λ) bits in order to perform verification of signatures2,
while each active signer only has to download O˜(λ · logN) bits. In Table 1,
we give a detailed comparison of our scheme with known lattice-based group
signatures, in terms of efficiency and functionality. The full dynamicity feature
is achieved with a very reasonable cost and without having to rely on lattice
trapdoors. Somewhat surprisingly, our scheme even produces shorter signatures
than the scheme from [30] - which is arguably the most efficient lattice-based
group signature known to date. Furthermore, these results are obtained in a
relatively simple manner, thanks to three main ideas/techniques discussed below.
Our starting point is the scheme [30], which works in the static setting. In-
stead of relying on trapdoor-based ordinary signatures as in prior works, the
LLNW scheme employs on a SIS-based Merkle tree accumulator. For a group
of N = 2ℓ users, the manager chooses uniformly random vectors x0, . . . ,xN−1;
hashes them to p0, . . . ,pN−1, respectively; builds a tree on top of these hash
values; and publishes the tree root u. The signing key of user i consists of xi
and the witness for the fact that pi was accumulated in u. When issuing sig-
natures, the user proves knowledge of a valid pair (xi,pi) and of the tree path
from pi to u. The user also has to encrypt the binary representation bin(i) of
his identity i, and prove that the ciphertext is well-formed. The encryption layer
is also lattice-trapdoor-free, since it utilizes the Naor-Yung double-encryption
paradigm [41] with Regev’s LWE-based encryption scheme [45]. To upgrade the
LLNW scheme directly into a fully dynamic group signature, we now let the
user compute the pair (xi,pi) on his own (for enabling non-frameability), and
we employ the following three ideas/techniques.
First, we add a dynamic ingredient into the static Merkle tree accumulator
from [30]. To this end, we equip it with an efficient updating algorithm with
complexity O(logN): to change an accumulated value, we simply update the
values at the corresponding leaf and along its path to the root.
Second, we create a simple rule to handle user enrollment and revocation
efficiently (i.e., without resetting the whole tree). Specifically, we use the up-
dating algorithm to set up the system so that: (i)- If a user has not joined the
group or has been revoked, the value at the leaf associated with him is set as 0;
(ii)- When a user joins the group, that value is set as his public key pi. Our
setup guarantees that only active users (i.e., who has joined and has not been
revoked at the given epoch) have their non-zero public keys accumulated into
the updated root. This rule effectively separates active users who can sign from
those who cannot: when signing messages, the user proceeds as in the LLNW
scheme, and is asked to additionally prove in zero-knowledge that pi 6= 0. In
other words, the seemingly big gap between being fully static and being fully
dynamic has been reduced to a small difference!
2 We remark that in the DDH-based instantiation from [7] which relies on the account-
able ring signature from [8], the verifiers have to periodically download public keys
of active signers. Our scheme overcomes this issue, thanks to the use of an updatable
accumulator constructed in Section 3.
Third, the arising question now is how to additionally prove the inequality
pi 6= 0 in the framework of the Stern-like [49] protocol from [30]. One would
naturally expect that this extra job could be done without losing too much in
terms of efficiency. Here, the surprising and somewhat unexpected fact is that we
can actually do it while gaining efficiency, thanks to the following simple idea.
Recall that, in [30], to prove knowledge of pi ∈ {0, 1}nk, an extension technique
from [35] is employed, in which pi is extended into a vector of dimension 2nk. We
note that, the authors of [35] also suggested a slightly modified version of their
technique, that allows to simultaneously prove that pi ∈ {0, 1}nk and pi is non-
zero while working only with dimension 2nk − 1. This intriguing tweak enables
us to obtain a zero-knowledge protocol with slightly lower communication cost,
and hence, group signatures with slightly smaller size than in [30].
Another problem we have to overcome is that the fully dynamic setting re-
quires a proof of correct opening, which boils down to proving correct decryp-
tion for Regev’s encryption scheme [45]. It involves modular linear equations
with bounded-norm secrets, and can be handled using Stern-like techniques
from [35,28].
Now, to equip the obtained fully dynamic group signature scheme with the
deniability functionality, we first incorporate Ishida et al.’s notion of deniabil-
ity [22] into Bootle et al.’s model [7]. Then we describe how to make our scheme
deniable, via a zero-knowledge argument of knowledge that a given Regev ci-
phertext [45] does not decrypt to a given message. The latter reduces to proving
knowledge of a non-zero vector b ∈ {−1, 0, 1}ℓ satisfying a modular linear equa-
tion, where b is the difference between the result of decryption and the given
message. This in turn can be handled by developing the above method for prov-
ing inequality in the framework of Stern’s protocol.
To summarize, we solve the prominent open question of achieving full dy-
namicity in the field of lattice-based group signatures. The scheme can be easily
extended to a deniable group signature. Moreover, our solution is simple and
comparatively efficient. Our results, while not yielding truly practical schemes,
would certainly help to enrich the field and bring lattice-based group signatures
one step closer to practice.
Remarks. This article is the full, extended version of [37], published in the
proceedings of ACNS 2017. In comparison with [37], the present version addi-
tionally introduces the deniability feature to the obtained fully dynamic group
signature scheme, and provides details of all the security proofs.
Organization. In Section 2, we recall some background on fully dynamic
group signatures and lattice-based cryptography. Section 3 develops an updat-
able Merkle tree accumulator. Our main scheme is constructed and analyzed in
Section 4. In Section 5, we demonstrate how to achieve deniability. Some details
are deferred to the appendix.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
In this paper, all vectors are column vectors. The concatenation two column
vectors x ∈ Rm and y ∈ Rk is denoted by (x‖y) ∈ Rm+k for simplicity. Let
‖ · ‖ and ‖ · ‖∞ be the Euclidean (ℓ2) norm and infinity (ℓ∞) norm of a vector
respectively. For a ∈ R, log a denotes logarithm of a with base 2. Denote [m] as
the set {1, 2, · · · ,m}.
2.2 Fully Dynamic Group Signatures
We recall the definition and security notions of fully dynamic group signatures
(FDGS) presented by Bootle et al. [7]. An FDGS scheme involves the follow-
ing entities: a group manager GM that determines who can join the group, a
tracing manager TM who can open signatures, and a set of users who are po-
tential group members. Users can join/leave the group at the discretion of GM.
We assume GM will publish some information infoτ regularly associated with
a distinct index τ (referred as epoch hereafter). Without loss of generality, as-
sume there is one-to-one correspondence between information and the associated
epoch. The information describes changes of the group, e.g., current group mem-
bers or members that are excluded from the group. We assume the published
group information is authentic. By comparing current group information with
previous one, it allows any party to identify revoked users at current epoch. For
simplicity assume τ1 < τ2 if infoτ1 is published before infoτ2 , i.e., the epoch pre-
serves the order in which the corresponding group information was published. In
existing models, the keys of authorities are supposed to be generated honestly;
while in [7], Bootle et al. consider a stronger model where the keys of authorities
can be maliciously generated by the adversary.
Syntax of fully dynamic group signatures. An FDGS scheme is a tuple of
following polynomial-time algorithms.
GSetup(λ)→ pp. On input security parameter λ, this algorithm generates pub-
lic parameters pp.
〈GKgenGM(pp),GKgenTM(pp)〉. This is an interactive protocol between the group
manager GM and the tracing manager TM. If it completes successfully, al-
gorithm GKgenGM outputs a manager key pair (mpk,msk). Meanwhile, GM
initializes the group information info and the registration table reg. The al-
gorithm GKgenTM outputs a tracing key pair (tpk, tsk). Set group public key
gpk = (pp,mpk, tpk).
UKgen(pp)→ (upk, usk). Given public parameters pp, this algorithm generates
a user key pair (upk, usk).
〈Join(infoτcurrent , gpk, upk, usk); Issue(infoτcurrent ,msk, upk)〉. This is an interactive
algorithm run by a user and GM. If it completes successfully, this user be-
comes a group member with an identifier uid and the Join algorithm stores
secret group signing key gsk[uid] while Issue algorithm stores registration
information in the table reg with index uid.
GUpdate(gpk,msk, infoτcurrent ,S, reg) → infoτnew . This is an algorithm run by
GM to update group information while advancing the epoch. Given gpk,msk,
infoτcurrent , registration table reg, a set S of active users to be removed from
the group, GM computes new group information infoτnew and may update
the table reg. If there is no change to the group, GM outputs ⊥.
Sign(gpk, gsk[uid], infoτ ,M)→ Σ. This algorithm outputs a group signature Σ
on message M by user uid. It outputs ⊥ if this user is inactive at epoch τ .
Verify(gpk, infoτ ,M,Σ)→ 0/1. This algorithm checks the validity of the signa-
ture Σ on message M at epoch τ .
Trace(gpk, tsk, infoτ , reg,M,Σ)→ (uid, Πtrace). This is an algorithm run by TM.
Given the inputs, TM returns an identity uid of a group member who signed
the message and a proof indicating this tracing result or ⊥ if it fails to trace
to a group member.
Judge(gpk, uid, infoτ , Πtrace,M,Σ)→ 0/1. This algorithm checks the validity of
Πtrace outputted by the Trace algorithm.
Correctness and security of fully dynamic group signatures. As put
forward by Bootle et al. [7], an FDGS scheme must satisfy correctness, anonymity,
non-frameability, traceability and tracing soundness.
Correctness demands that a signature generated by an honest and active user
is always accepted by algorithm Verify, and that algorithm Trace can always
identify that user, as well as produces a proof accepted by algorithm Judge.
Anonymity requires that it is infeasible for any PPT adversary to distinguish
signatures generated by two active users of its choice at the chosen epoch, even
if it can corrupt any user, can choose the key of GM, and is given access to the
Trace oracle.
Non-Frameability makes sure that the adversary cannot generate a valid signa-
ture that traces to an honest user even if it can corrupt all other users, and can
choose keys of both managers.
Traceability ensures that the adversary cannot produce a valid signature that
cannot be traced to an active user at the chosen epoch, even if it can corrupt
any user and can choose the key of TM.
Tracing Soundness requires that it is infeasible to produce a valid signature that
traces to two different users, even if all group users and both managers are fully
controlled by the adversary.
We will define these requirements using a set of experiments, in which the
adversary has access to a set of oracles. The oracles use the following global
variables: HUL is a list of users whose keys are generated honestly. BUL is a list
of users whose secret signing keys are revealed to the adversary; CUL is a list of
users whose public keys are chosen by the adversary; SL is a set of signatures
that are generated by the oracle Sign; CL is a set of signatures that are generated
by the oracle Chalb.
AddU(uid). This oracle adds an honest user uid to the group at current epoch.
It returns upk[uid] and adds uid to the list HUL.
CrptU(uid, pk). This oracle allows the adversary to create a new user by choosing
the key upk[uid] as pk. It then adds uid to the list CUL. It returns ⊥ if
uid ∈ HUL ∪ CUL. This actually prepares for calling the oracle SndToGM.
SndToGM(uid,Min). This oracle engages in the 〈Join, Issue〉 protocol between
the adversary, who corrupts the user uid in the list CUL, and the honest
Issue-executing group manager.
SndToU(uid,Min). This oracle engages in the 〈Join, Issue〉 protocol between the
adversary, who corrupts the group manager, and the honest Join−executing
user uid in the list HUL.
RReg(uid). This oracle returns registration information reg[uid] of user uid.
MReg(uid, ρ). This oracle modifies reg[uid] to any ρ chosen by the adversary.
RevealU(uid). This oracle returns secret signing key gsk[uid] to the adversary,
and adds this user to the list BUL.
Sign(uid,M, τ). This oracle returns a signature on the message M by the user
uid at epoch τ , and then add the signature to the list SL.
Chalb(infoτ , uid0, uid1,M). This oracle receives inputs from the adversary, re-
turns a signature on M by the user uidb at epoch τ , and then adds the
signature to the list CL. It is required that the two challenged users are
active at epoch τ and this oracle can only be called once.
Trace(M,Σ, Infoτ ). This oracle returns the signer of the signature together with
a proof, with respect to the epoch τ . We require that the signature is not in
the list CL.
GUpdate(S). This oracle allows the adversary to update the group at current
epoch τcurrent. It is required that S is a set of active users at current epoch.
We also need the following polynomial-time algorithm in security experiments
to ease composition.
IsActive(infoτ , reg, uid) → 0/1: It outputs 1 if this user is active at epoch τ
and 0 otherwise.
We refer the readers to [7] for detailed descriptions of the above oracles.
Definition 1. For any security parameter λ and any PPT adversary A, we
define correctness and security experiments in Fig. 1.
For correctness, non-frameability, traceability and tracing soundness, the ad-
vantage of the adversary is defined as the probability of outputting 1 in the cor-
responding experiment. For anonymity, the advantage is defined as the absolute
difference of probability of outputting 1 between experiment Expanon−1FDGS,A and ex-
periment Expanon−0FDGS,A.
A fully dynamic group signature scheme is said to be correct and secure (i.e.,
anonymous, non-frameable, traceable and tracing sound) if the advantages of the
adversary in all considered experiments are negligible in λ.
Experiment: ExpcorrFDGS,A(λ)
pp ← GSetup(λ),HUL := ∅.
〈(info,mpk,msk); (tpk, tsk)〉 ← 〈GKgenGM(pp),GKgenTM(pp)〉.
Set gpk = (pp,mpk, tpk). (uid,M, τ )← AAddU,RReg,GUpdate(gpk, info).
If uid /∈ HUL or gsk[uid] = ⊥ or infoτ = ⊥ or IsActive(infoτ , reg, uid) = 0, return 0.
Σ ← Sign(gpk, gsk[uid], infoτ ,M), (uid
∗,Πtrace)← Trace(gpk, tsk, infoτ , reg,M,Σ).
Return 1 if (Verify(gpk, infoτ ,M,Σ) = 0 ∨ Judge(gpk, uid, infoτ ,Πtrace,m,Σ) =
0 ∨ uid 6= uid∗).
Experiment: Expanon−b
FDGS,A(λ)
pp ← GSetup(λ),HUL,CUL,BUL,CL,SL := ∅.
(stinit, info,mpk,msk)← A
〈·,GKgenTM〉(pp)(init : pp).
Return 0 if GKgenTM did not accept or A’s output is not well-formed.
Denote the output of GKgenTM as (tpk, tsk), and set gpk = (pp,mpk, tpk).
b∗ ← AAddU,CrptU,RevealU,SndToU,Trace,MReg,Chalb (play : stinit, gpk). Return b
∗.
Experiment: Expnon−frameFDGS,A (λ)
pp ← GSetup(λ),HUL,CUL,BUL,SL = ∅.
(stinit, info,mpk,msk, tpk, tsk)← A(init : pp).
Return 0 if A’s output is not well-formed, otherwise set gpk = (pp,mpk, tpk).
(M,Σ, uid,Πtrace, infoτ )← A
CrptU,RevealU,SndToU,MReg,Sign(play : stinit, gpk).
Return 1 if (Verify(gpk, infoτ ,M,Σ) = 1 ∧ Judge(gpk, uid, infoτ ,Πtrace,M,Σ) = 1∧
uid ∈ HUL \ BUL ∧ (M,Σ, τ ) /∈ SL).
Experiment: ExptraceFDGS,A(λ)
pp ← GSetup(λ),HUL,CUL,BUL,SL = ∅.
(stinit, tpk, tsk)← A
〈GKgenGM (pp),·〉(init : pp).
Return 0 if GKgenGM did not accept or A’s output is not well-formed.
Denote the output of GKgenGM as (mpk,msk, info), and set gpk = (pp,mpk, tpk).
(M,Σ, τ )← AAddU,CrptU,SndToGM,RevealU,MReg,Sign,GUpdate (play : stinit, gpk, info).
If Verify(gpk, infoτ ,M,Σ) = 0, return 0.
(uid, Πtrace)← Trace(gpk, tsk, infoτ , reg,M,Σ).
Return 1 if (IsActive(infoτ , reg, uid) = ⊥ ∨ Judge(gpk, uid, infoτ ,Πtrace,M,Σ) =
0 ∨ uid = 0).
Experiment: Exptrace−soundFDGS,A (λ)
pp ← GSetup(λ),CUL = ∅. (stinit, info,mpk,msk, tpk, tsk)← A(init : pp).
Return 0 if A’s output is not well-formed, otherwise set gpk = (pp,mpk, tpk).
(M,Σ, uid0,Πtrace,0, uid1, Πtrace,1, infoτ )← A
CrptU,MReg(play : stinit, gpk).
Return 1 if (Verify(gpk, infoτ ,M,Σ) = 1 ∧ uid0 ( 6= ⊥) 6= uid1 ( 6= ⊥) ∧
Judge(gpk, uidb, infoτ , Πtrace,b,M,Σ) = 1 for b ∈ {0, 1}).
Fig. 1: Experiments to define security requirements of FDGS.
2.3 Background on Lattices
We recall the average-case lattice problems SIS and LWE, together with their
hardness results.
Definition 2 ([1,19]). The SIS∞n,m,q,β problem is as follows: Given uniformly
random matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , find a non-zero vector x ∈ Zm such that ‖x‖∞ ≤ β
and A · x = 0 mod q.
If m,β = poly(n), and q > β · O˜(√n), then the SIS∞n,m,q,β problem is at least
as hard as worst-case lattice problem SIVPγ for some γ = β · O˜(
√
nm) (see,
e.g., [19,39]). Specifically, when β = 1, q = O˜(n), m = 2n⌈log q⌉, the SIS∞n,m,q,1
problem is at least as hard as SIVPγ with γ = O˜(n).
In the last decade, numerous SIS-based cryptographic primitives have been
proposed. In this work, we will extensively employ 2 such constructions:
– Our group signature scheme is based on the Merkle tree accumulator from [30],
which is built upon a specific family of collision-resistant hash functions.
– Our zero-knowledge argument systems use the statistically hiding and com-
putationally binding string commitment scheme from [24].
For appropriate setting of parameters, the security of the above two constructions
can be based on the worst-case hardness of SIVP
O˜(n)
.
In the group signature in Section 4, we will employ the multi-bit version of
Regev’s encryption scheme [45], presented in [23]. The scheme is based on the
hardness of the LWE problem.
Definition 3 ([45]). Let n,m ≥ 1, q ≥ 2, and let χ be a probability distribution
on Z. For s ∈ Znq , let As,χ be the distribution obtained by sampling a $←− Znq and
e ←֓ χ, and outputting (a, s⊤ · a + e) ∈ Znq × Zq. The LWEn,q,χ problem asks
to distinguish m samples chosen according to As,χ (for s $←− Znq ) and m samples
chosen according to the uniform distribution over Znq × Zq.
If q is a prime power, χ is the discrete Gaussian distribution DZ,αq, where αq ≥
2
√
n, then LWEn,q,χ is as least as hard as SIVPO˜(n/α) (see [45,38,39]).
2.4 Stern-like Protocols for Lattice-Based Relations
The zero-knowledge (ZK) argument systems appearing in this paper operate
in the framework of Stern’s protocol [49]. Let us now recall some background.
This protocol was originally proposed in the context of code-based cryptog-
raphy, and was later adapted into the lattice setting by Kawachi et al. [24].
Subsequently, it was empowered by Ling et al. [35] to handle the matrix-vector
relations associated with the SIS and LWE problems, and further developed to
design several lattice-based schemes: group signatures [27,36,30,31,28], policy-
based signatures [16] and group encryption [29].
Stern-like protocols are quite useful in the context of lattice-based privacy-
preserving systems, when one typically works with modular linear equations of
the form
∑
iMi · xi = v mod q - where {Mi}i, v are public, and one wants to
prove in ZK that secret vectors {xi}i satisfy certain constraints, e.g., they have
small norms and/or have coordinates arranged in a special way. The high-level
ideas can be summarized as follows. If the given constraints are invariant under
certain type of permutations of coordinates, then one readily uses uniformly
random permutations to prove those constraints. Otherwise, one performs some
pre-processings with {xi}i to reduce to the former case. Meanwhile, to prove
that the modular linear equation holds, one makes use of a standard masking
technique.
The basic protocol consists of 3 moves: commitment, challenge, response. If
the statistically hiding and computationally binding string commitment scheme
from [24] is employed in the first move, then one obtains a statistical zero-
knowledge argument of knowledge (ZKAoK) with perfect completeness, constant
soundness error 2/3, and communication costO(|w|·log q), where |w| denotes the
total bit-size of the secret vectors. In many applications, the protocol is repeated
κ = ω(logλ) times, for security parameter λ, to achieve negligible soundness
error, and then made non-interactive via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [18]. In the
random oracle model, this results in a non-interactive zero-knowledge argument
of knowledge (NIZKAoK) with bit-size O(|w| · log q) · ω(logλ).
3 Updatable Lattice-Based Merkle Hash Trees
We first recall the lattice-based Merkle-tree accumulator from [30], and then, we
equip it with a simple updating algorithm which allows to change an accumulated
value in time logarithmic in the size of the accumulated set. This updatable hash
tree will serve as the building block of our construction in Section 4.
3.1 Cryptographic Accumulators
An accumulator scheme is a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms defined below.
TSetup(λ) On input security parameter λ, output the public parameter pp.
TAccpp On input a set R = {d0, . . . ,dN−1} of N data values, output an accu-
mulator value u.
TWitnesspp On input a data set R and a value d, output ⊥ if d /∈ R; otherwise
output a witness w for the fact that d is accumulated in TAcc(R). (Typically,
the size of w should be short (e.g., constant or logarithmic inN) to be useful.)
TVerifypp On input accumulator value u and a value-witness pair (d, w), out-
put 1 (which indicates that (d, w) is valid for the accumulator u) or 0.
An accumulator scheme is called correct if for all pp ← TSetup(λ), we have
TVerifypp
(
TAccpp(R),d,TWitnesspp(R,d)
)
= 1 for all d ∈ R.
A natural security requirement for accumulators, as considered in [3,12,30],
says that it is infeasible to prove that a value d∗ was accumulated in a value u
if it was not. This property is formalized as follows.
Definition 4 ([30]). An accumulator scheme (TSetup,TAcc,TWitness,TVerify)
is called secure if for all PPT adversaries A:
Pr
[
pp ← TSetup(λ); (R,d∗, w∗)← A(pp) :
d∗ 6∈ R ∧ TVerifypp(TAccpp(R),d∗, w∗) = 1
]
= negl(λ).
3.2 The LLNW Merkle-tree Accumulator
Notations. Hereunder we will use the notation x
$←− S to indicate that x is
chosen uniformly at random from finite set S. For bit b ∈ {0, 1}, we let b¯ = 1−b.
The Merkle-tree accumulator scheme from [30] works with parameters n = O(λ),
q = O˜(n1.5), k = ⌈log2 q⌉, andm = 2nk. The set Zq is identified by {0, . . . , q−1}.
Define the “powers-of-2” matrix
G =
1 2 4 . . . 2k−1 . . .
1 2 4 . . . 2k−1
 ∈ Zn×nkq .
Note that for every v ∈ Znq , we have v = G · bin(v), where bin(v) ∈ {0, 1}nk
denotes the binary representation of v. The scheme is built upon the following
family of SIS-based collision-resistant hash functions.
Definition 5. The function family H mapping {0, 1}nk×{0, 1}nk to {0, 1}nk is
defined as H = {hA |A ∈ Zn×mq }, where for A = [A0|A1] with A0,A1 ∈ Zn×nkq ,
and for any (u0,u1) ∈ {0, 1}nk × {0, 1}nk, we have:
hA(u0,u1) = bin
(
A0 · u0 +A1 · u1 mod q
) ∈ {0, 1}nk.
Note that hA(u0,u1) = u⇔ A0 · u0 +A1 · u1 = G · u mod q.
A Merkle tree with N = 2ℓ leaves, where ℓ is a positive integer, then can be
constructed based on the function family H as follows.
TSetup(λ). Sample A
$←− Zn×mq , and output pp = A.
TAccA(R = {d0 ∈ {0, 1}nk, . . . ,dN−1 ∈ {0, 1}nk}). For every j ∈ [0, N − 1], let
bin(j) = (j1, . . . , jℓ) ∈ {0, 1}ℓ be the binary representation of j, and let
dj = uj1,...,jℓ . Form the tree of depth ℓ = logN based on the N leaves
u0,0,...,0, . . . ,u1,1,...,1 as follows:
1. At depth i ∈ [ℓ], the node ub1,...,bi ∈ {0, 1}nk, for all (b1, . . . , bi) ∈ {0, 1}i,
is defined as hA(ub1,...,bi,0,ub1,...,bi,1).
2. At depth 0: The root u ∈ {0, 1}nk is defined as hA(u0,u1).
The algorithm outputs the accumulator value u.
TWitnessA(R,d). If d 6∈ R, return ⊥. Otherwise, d = dj for some j ∈ [0, N − 1]
with binary representation (j1, . . . , jℓ). Output the witness w defined as:
w =
(
(j1, . . . , jℓ), (uj1,...,jℓ−1,j¯ℓ , . . . ,uj1,j¯2 ,uj¯1)
) ∈ {0, 1}ℓ × ({0, 1}nk)ℓ,
for uj1,...,jℓ−1,j¯ℓ , . . . ,uj1,j¯2 ,uj¯1 computed by algorithm TAccA(R).
TVerify
A
(
u,d, w
)
. Let the given witness w be of the form:
w =
(
(j1, . . . , jℓ), (wℓ, . . . ,w1)
) ∈ {0, 1}ℓ × ({0, 1}nk)ℓ.
The algorithm recursively computes the path vℓ,vℓ−1, . . . ,v1,v0 ∈ {0, 1}nk
as follows: vℓ = d and
∀i ∈ {ℓ− 1, . . . , 1, 0} : vi =
{
hA(vi+1,wi+1), if ji+1 = 0;
hA(wi+1,vi+1), if ji+1 = 1.
(1)
Then it returns 1 if v0 = u. Otherwise, it returns 0.
The following lemma states the correctness and security of the above Merkle
tree accumulator.
Lemma 1 ([30]). The given accumulator scheme is correct and is secure in the
sense of Definition 4, assuming the hardness of the SIS∞n,m,q,1 problem.
3.3 An Efficient Updating Algorithm
Unlike the static group signature scheme from [30], our fully dynamic construc-
tion of Section 4 requires to regularly edit the accumulated values without having
to reconstruct the whole tree. To this end, we equip the Merkle tree accumulator
from [30] with a simple, yet efficient, updating algorithm: to change the value at
a given leaf, we simply modify all values in the path from that leaf to the root.
The algorithm, which takes as input a bit string bin(j) = (j1, j2, . . . , jℓ) and a
value d∗ ∈ {0, 1}nk, is formally described below.
Given the tree in Section 3.2, algorithm TUpdateA((j1, j2, . . . , jℓ),d
∗) per-
forms the following steps:
1. Let dj be the current value at the leaf of position determined by bin(j), and
let ((j1, . . . , jℓ), (wj,ℓ, . . . ,wj,1)) be its associated witness.
2. Set vℓ := d
∗ and recursively compute the path vℓ,vℓ−1, . . . ,v1,v0 ∈ {0, 1}nk
as in (1).
3. Set u := v0; uj1 := v1; . . . ;uj1,j2,...,jℓ−1 := vℓ−1; uj1,j2,...,jℓ := vℓ = d
∗.
It can be seen that the provided algorithm runs in time O(ℓ) = O(logN). In
Fig. 2, we give an illustrative example of a tree with 23 = 8 leaves.
4 Our Fully Dynamic Group Signatures from Lattices
In this section, we construct our lattice-based fully dynamic group signature
and prove its security in Bootle et al.’s model [7]. We start with the LLNW
scheme [30], which works in the static setting.
While other constructions of lattice-based group signatures employ trapdoor-
based ordinary signature schemes (e.g., [9,14]) to certify users, the LLNW scheme
relies on a SIS-based Merkle tree accumulator which we recalled in Section 3.2.
uu000 u111u011 u100u010 u101u001 u110
d0 d7d3 d4d2 d5d1 d6
u00 u11u01 u10
u0 u1
Fig. 2: A Merkle tree with 23 = 8 leaves, which accumulates the data blocks
d0, . . . ,d7 into the value u at the root. The bit string (101) and the pink nodes
form a witness to the fact that d5 is accumulated in u. If we replace d5 by a
new value d∗, we only need to update the yellow nodes.
The GM, who manages a group of N = 2ℓ users, chooses uniformly random
vectors x0, . . . ,xN−1 ∈ {0, 1}m; hashes them to p0, . . . ,pN−1 ∈ {0, 1}nk, re-
spectively; builds a tree on top of these hash values; and lets the tree root
u ∈ {0, 1}nk be part of the group public key. The signing key of user i consists of
xi and the witness for the fact that pi was accumulated in u. When generating
group signatures, the user proves knowledge of a valid pair (xi,pi) and of the
tree path from pi to u. The user also has to encrypt the binary representation
bin(i) of his identity i, and prove that the ciphertext is well-formed. The encryp-
tion layer utilizes the Naor-Yung double-encryption paradigm [41] with Regev’s
LWE-based cryptosystem, and thus, it is also lattice-trapdoor-free.
To upgrade the LLNW scheme directly into a fully dynamic group signature,
some tweaks and new ideas are needed. First, to enable the non-frameability
feature, we let the user compute the pair (xi,pi) on his own. The second problem
we have to consider is that Merkle hash trees seem to be a static primitive. To
this end, we equip the accumulator with an efficient updating algorithm (see
Section 3.3). Now, the challenging question is how to handle user enrollment
and revocation in a simple manner (i.e., without having to reset the whole tree).
To tackle these issues, we associate each of the N potential users with a leaf in
the tree, and then use the updating algorithm to set up the system so that:
1. If a user has not joined the group or has been revoked, the value at the leaf
associated with him is set as 0;
2. When a user joins the group, that value is set as his public key pi.
Our setup guarantees that only active users (i.e., who has joined and has not
been revoked at the given epoch) have their non-zero public keys accumulated
into the updated root. This effectively gives us a method to separate active users
who can sign from those who cannot: when signing messages, the user proceeds
as in the LLNW scheme, and is asked to additionally prove in ZK that pi 6= 0.
At this point, the arising question is how to prove the inequality pi 6= 0 in the
framework of the Stern-like [49] protocol from [30]. One would naturally hope
that this extra job could be done without losing too much in terms of efficiency.
Here, the surprising and somewhat unexpected fact is that we can actually do
it while gaining efficiency, thanks to a technique originally proposed in [35].
To begin with, let BLt denote the set of all vectors in {0, 1}L having Ham-
ming weight exactly t. In Stern-like protocols (see Section 2.4), a common tech-
nique for proving in ZK the possession of p ∈ {0, 1}nk consists of appending
nk “dummy” entries to it to obtain p∗ ∈ B2nknk , and demonstrating to the ver-
ifier that a random permutation of p∗ belongs to the “target set” B2nknk . This
suffices to convince the verifier that the original vector p belongs to {0, 1}nk,
while the latter cannot learn any additional information about p, thanks to the
randomness of the permutation. This extending-then-permuting technique was
first proposed in [35], and was extensively used in the underlying protocol of the
LLNW scheme. Now, to address our question, we will employ a modified version
of this technique, which was also initially suggested in [35]. Let us think of an-
other “target set”, so that it is possible to extend p ∈ {0, 1}nk to an element of
that set if and only if p is non-zero. That set is B2nk−1nk . Indeed, the extended vec-
tor p∗ belongs to B2nk−1nk if and only if the original vector has Hamming weight
at least nk − (nk − 1) = 1, which means that it cannot be a zero-vector. When
combining with the permuting step, this modification allows us to additionally
prove the given inequality while working with smaller dimension. As a result,
our fully dynamic scheme produces slightly shorter signatures than the original
static scheme.
Finally, we remark that the fully dynamic setting requires a proof of correct
opening, which boils down to proving correct decryption for Regev’s encryption
scheme. It involves modular linear equations with bounded-norm secrets, and
can be easily handled using Stern-like techniques from [35,28].
4.1 Description of the Scheme
Our scheme is described as follows.
GSetup(λ). On input security parameter λ, this algorithm specifies the following:
– An expected number of potential users N = 2ℓ = poly(λ).
– Dimension n = O(λ), prime modulus q = O˜(n1.5), and k = ⌈log2 q⌉.
These parameters implicitly determine the “powers-of-2” matrix G ∈
Zn×nkq , as defined in Section 3.
– Matrix dimensions m = 2nk for the hashing layer, and mE = 2(n+ ℓ)k
for the encryption layer.
– An integer β =
√
n · ω(logn), and a β-bounded noise distribution χ.
– A hash function HFS : {0, 1}∗ → {1, 2, 3}κ, where κ = ω(logλ), to be
modelled as a random oracle in the Fiat-Shamir transformations [18].
– Let COM : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}m → Znq be the string commitment scheme
from [24], to be used in our zero-knowledge argument systems.
– Uniformly random matrix A ∈ Zn×mq .
The algorithm outputs public parameters
pp = {λ,N, n, q, k,m,mE, ℓ, β, χ, κ,HFS,COM,A}.
〈GKgenGM(pp),GKgenTM(pp)〉. The group manager GM and the tracing manager
TM initialize their keys and the public group information as follows.
– GKgenGM(pp). This algorithm samples msk
$←− {0, 1}m and computes
mpk = A · msk mod q, and outputs (mpk,msk). Here, we consider mpk
as an identifier of the group managed by GM who has mpk as his public
key. Furthermore, as in [7, Sec. 3.3, full version], we assume that the
group information board is visible to everyone, but can only be edited
by a party knowing msk.
– GKgenTM(pp). This algorithm initializes the Naor-Yung double-encryption
mechanism with the ℓ-bit version Regev encryption scheme. It first chooses
B
$←− Zn×mEq . For each i ∈ {1, 2}, it samples Si $←− χn×ℓ, Ei ←֓ χℓ×mE ,
and computes Pi = S
⊤
i ·B+Ei ∈ Zℓ×mEq . Then, TM sets tsk = (S1,E1),
and tpk = (B,P1,P2).
– TM sends tpk to GM who initializes the following:
• Table reg := (reg[0][1], reg[0][2], . . . , reg[N −1][1], reg[N −1][2]),
where for each i ∈ [0, N − 1]: reg[i][1] = 0nk and reg[i][2] = 0.
Looking ahead, reg[i][1] will be used to record the public key of a
registered user, while reg[i][2] stores the epoch at which the user
joins.
• The Merkle tree T built on top of reg[0][1], . . . , reg[N−1][1]. (Note
that T is an all-zero tree at this stage, but it will be modified when a
new user joins the group, or when GM computes the updated group
information.)
• Counter of registered users c := 0.
Then, GM outputs gpk = (pp,mpk, tpk) and announces the initial group
information info = ∅. He keeps T and c for himself.
UKgen(pp). Each potential group user samples usk = x
$←− {0, 1}m, and com-
putes upk = p = bin(A · x) mod q ∈ {0, 1}nk.
Without loss of generality, we assume that every honestly generated upk is a
non-zero vector. (Otherwise, the user would either pick x = 0 or accidentally
find a solution to the SIS∞n,m,q,1 problem associated with matrix A - both
happen with negligible probability.)
〈Join, Issue〉. If the user with key pair (upk, usk) = (p,x) requests to join the
group at epoch τ , he sends p to GM. If the latter accepts the request, then
the two parties proceed as follows.
1. GM issues a member identifier for the user as uid = bin(c) ∈ {0, 1}ℓ. The
user then sets his long-term signing key as gsk[c] = (bin(c),p,x).
2. GM performs the following updates:
– Update T by running algorithm TUpdateA(bin(c),p).
– Register the user to table reg as reg[c][1] := p; reg[c][2] := τ .
– Increase the counter c := c+ 1.
GUpdate(gpk,msk, infoτcurrent ,S, reg). This algorithm is run by GM to update
the group information while also advancing the epoch. It works as follows.
1. Let the set S contain the public keys of registered users to be revoked.
If S = ∅, then go to Step 2.
Otherwise, S = {reg[i1][1], . . . , reg[ir][1]}, for some r ∈ [1, N ] and some
i1, . . . , ir ∈ [0, N−1]. Then, for all t ∈ [r], GM runs TUpdateA(bin(it),0nk)
to update the tree T .
2. At this point, by construction, each of the zero leaves in the tree T
corresponds to either a revoked user or a potential user who has not yet
registered. In other words, only active users who are allowed to sign in
the new epoch τnew have their non-zero public keys, denoted by {pj}j ,
accumulated in the root uτnew of the updated tree.
For each j, let wj ∈ {0, 1}ℓ× ({0, 1}nk)ℓ be the witness for the fact that
pj is accumulated in uτnew . Then GM publishes the group information
of the new epoch as:
infoτnew =
(
uτnew , {wj}j
)
.
We remark that the infoτ outputted at each epoch by GM is technically not
part of the verification key. Indeed, as we will describe below, in order to
verify signatures bound to epoch τ , the verifiers only need to download the
first component uτ of size O˜(λ) bits. Meanwhile, each active signer only has
to download the respective witness of size O˜(λ) · ℓ.
Sign(gpk, gsk[j], infoτ ,M). To sign messageM using the group information infoτ
at epoch τ , the user possessing gsk[j] = (bin(j),p,x) first checks if infoτ in-
cludes a witness containing bin(j). If this is not the case, return⊥. Otherwise,
the user downloads uτ and the witness of the form
(
bin(j), (wℓ, . . . ,w1)
)
from infoτ , and proceeds as follows.
1. Encrypt vector bin(j) ∈ {0, 1}ℓ twice using Regev’s encryption scheme.
Namely, for each i ∈ {1, 2}, sample ri $←− {0, 1}mE and compute
ci = (ci,1, ci,2)
=
(
B · ri mod q, Pi · ri +
⌊q
2
⌋ · bin(j) mod q) ∈ Znq × Zℓq.
2. Generate a NIZKAoK Πgs to demonstrate the possession of a valid tuple
ζ = (x,p, bin(j),wℓ, . . . ,w1, r1, r2) (2)
such that:
(i) TVerifyA
(
uτ ,p,
(
bin(j), (wℓ, . . . ,w1)
))
= 1 and A ·x = G ·p mod q;
(ii) c1 and c2 are both correct encryptions of bin(j) with randomness r1
and r2, respectively;
(iii) p 6= 0nk.
Note that statements (i) and (ii) were covered by the LLNW proto-
col [30]. Meanwhile, statement (iii) is handled using the technique de-
scribed at the beginning of this Section. We thus obtain a Stern-like in-
teractive zero-knowledge argument system which is a slight modification
of the one from [30]. The detailed description of the protocol is presented
in Section 4.3. The protocol is repeated κ = ω(logλ) times to achieve
negligible soundness error and made non-interactive via the Fiat-Shamir
heuristic as a triple Πgs = ({CMTi}κi=1,CH, {RSP}κi=1), where
CH = HFS
(
M, ({CMTi}κi=1,A,uτ ,B,P1,P2, c1, c2
) ∈ {1, 2, 3}κ.
3. Output the group signature
Σ = (Πgs, c1, c2). (3)
Verify(gpk, infoτ ,M,Σ). This algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. Download uτ ∈ {0, 1}nk from infoτ .
2. Parse Σ as Σ =
({CMTi}κi=1, (Ch1, . . . , Chκ), {RSP}κi=1, c1, c2).
If (Ch1, . . . , Chκ) 6= HFS
(
M, ({CMTi}κi=1,A,uτ ,B,P1,P2, c1, c2
)
, then
return 0.
3. For each i ∈ [κ], run the verification phase of the protocol in Section 4.3
to check the validity of RSPi with respect to CMTi and Chi. If any of
the conditions does not hold, then return 0.
4. Return 1.
Trace(gpk, tsk, infoτ , reg,M,Σ). This algorithm parses tsk as (S1,E1), parses Σ
as in (3), and performs the following steps.
1. Use S1 to decrypt c1 = (c1,1, c1,2) to obtain a string b
′ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ (i.e.,
by computing
⌊ (c1,2−S⊤1 ·c1,1)
⌊q/2⌋
⌉
).
2. If infoτ does not include a witness containing b
′, then return ⊥.
3. Let j′ ∈ [0, N − 1] be the integer having binary representation b′. If the
record reg[j′][1] in table reg is 0nk, then return ⊥.
4. Generate a NIZKAoK Πtrace to demonstrate the possession of S1 ∈ Zn×ℓ,
E1 ∈ Zℓ×mE , and y ∈ Zℓ, such that:
‖S1‖∞ ≤ β; ‖E1‖∞ ≤ β; ‖y‖∞ ≤ ⌈q/5⌉;
S⊤1 ·B+E1 = P1 mod q;
c1,2 − S⊤1 · c1,1 = y+ ⌊q/2⌋ · b′ mod q.
(4)
As the statement involves modular linear equations with bounded-norm
secrets, we can obtain a statistical zero-knowledge argument by employ-
ing the Stern-like interactive protocol from [28]. For completeness, the
detailed description of the protocol is presented in Section 4.4. The pro-
tocol is repeated κ = ω(logλ) times to achieve negligible soundness
error and made non-interactive via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic as a triple
Πtrace = ({CMTi}κi=1,CH, {RSP}κi=1), where
CH = HFS
(
({CMTi}κi=1, gpk, infoτ ,M,Σ,b′
) ∈ {1, 2, 3}κ. (5)
5. Set uid = b′ and output (uid, Πtrace).
Judge(gpk, uid, infoτ , Πtrace,M,Σ). This algorithm consists of verifying the argu-
ment Πtrace w.r.t. common input (gpk, infoτ ,M,Σ, uid), in a similar manner
as in algorithm Verify.
If Πtrace does not verify, return 0. Otherwise, return 1.
4.2 Analysis of the Scheme
Efficiency. We first analyze the efficiency of the scheme described in Sec-
tion 4.1, with respect to security parameter λ and parameter ℓ = logN .
– The public key gpk contains several matrices, and has bit-size O˜(λ2 + λ · ℓ).
– For each j ∈ [0, N−1], the signing key gsk[j] has bit-size ℓ+nk+m = O˜(λ)+ℓ.
– At each epoch, the signature verifiers downloads nk = O˜(λ) bits, while each
active signer downloads O˜(λ·ℓ) bits.
– The size of signature Σ is dominated by that of the Stern-like NIZKAoK
Πgs, which is O(|ζ| · log q) · ω(logλ), where |ζ| denotes the bit-size of the
witness-tuple ζ in (2). Overall, Σ has bit-size O˜(λ·ℓ).
– The Stern-like NIZKAoK Πtrace has bit-size O˜(ℓ2 + λ · ℓ).
Correctness. We now demonstrate that the scheme is correct with over-
whelming probability, based on the perfect completeness of Stern-like protocols,
and the correctness of Regev’s encryption scheme.
First, note that a signature Σ = (Πgs, c1, c2) generated by an active and hon-
est user j is always accepted by algorithm Verify. Indeed, such a user can always
compute a tuple ζ = (x,p, bin(j),wℓ, . . . ,w1, r1, r2) satisfying conditions (i),(ii)
and (iii) in the Sign algorithm. The completeness of the underlying argument
system then guarantees that Σ is always accepted by algorithm Verify.
Next, we show that algorithm Trace outputs bin(j) with overwhelming prob-
ability, and produces a proof Πtrace accepted by algorithm Judge. Observe that,
the decryption algorithm essentially computes
e = c1,2 − ST1 c1,1 = E1 · r1 + ⌊q/2⌋ · bin(j) mod q,
and sets the j-th bit of b′ to be 0 if j-th entry of e is closer to 0 than to
⌊q/2⌋ and 1 otherwise. Note that our parameters are set so that ‖E1 · r1‖∞ <
q/5, for E1 ←֓ χℓ×mE and r1 $←− {0, 1}mE . This ensures that b′ = bin(j) with
overwhelming probability.
Further, as the user is active, infoτ must contain w = (bin(j),wℓ, . . . ,w1)
and reg[j][1] in table reg is not 0nk. Therefore, algorithm Trace will move to
the 4-th step, where it can always obtain the tuple (S1,E1,y) satisfying the
conditions in (4). By the completeness of the argument system, Πtrace will be
accepted by the algorithm Judge.
Security. In Theorem 1, we prove that our scheme satisfies the security re-
quirements of the Bootle et al.’s model [7].
Theorem 1. Assume that the Stern-like argument systems used in Section 4.1
are simulation-sound. Then, in the random oracle model, the given fully dynamic
group signature satisfies the anonymity, traceability, non-frameability and tracing
soundness requirements under the LWEn,q,χ and SIS
∞
n,m,q,1 assumptions.
In the random oracle model, the proof of Theorem 1 relies on the following facts:
1. The Stern-like zero-knowledge argument systems being used are simulation-
sound;
2. The underlying encryption scheme, which is obtained from Regev cryptosys-
tem [45] via the Naor-Yung transformation [41], is IND-CCA2 secure;
3. The Merkle tree accumulator we employ is secure in the sense of Definition 4;
4. For a properly generated key-pair (x,p), it is infeasible to find x′ ∈ {0, 1}m
such that x′ 6= x and bin(A · x′ mod q) = p.
The proof of Theorem 1 is established by Lemmas 2-5 given below.
Lemma 2. Assume that the LWEn,q,χ problem is hard. Then the given FDGS
scheme provides anonymity in the random oracle model.
Proof. Let A,B be PPT algorithms, act as the adversary and challenger in the
games respectively. We construct a sequence of indistinguishable games, in which
the first game is the experiment Expanon−0FDGS,A(λ) and the last one is the experi-
ment Expanon−1FDGS,A(λ). We will prove the lemma by demonstrating that any two
consecutive games are indistinguishable. For each i, we denote by Wi the output
of the adversary in game i.
Specifically, we consider the following games.
Game 0: This is exactly the experiment Expanon−0FDGS,A(λ).
Game 1: This game is the same as Game 0 with only one modification: add
(S2,E2) to tsk. This will make no difference to the view of the adversary. So
Pr[W1 = 1] = Pr[Exp
anon−0
FDGS,A(λ) = 1].
Game 2: This game is identical to Game 1 except that it generates a sim-
ulated proof for the oracle Trace by programming the random oracle HFS
even though the challenger B has correct witnesses to generate a real proof.
The view of the adversary, however, is statistically indistinguishable between
Game 1 and Game 2 by statistical zero-knowledge property of our argument
system generating Πtrace. Therefore we have Pr[W1 = 1] ≈ Pr[W2 = 1].
Game 3: This game uses S2 instead of S1 to simulate the oracle Trace. The view
of A is the same as in Game 2 until event F1, where A queries the trace oracle
a valid signature (M,Πgs, c1, c2, infoτ ) with c1, c2 encrypting distinct bit
strings, happens. Since F1 breaks the soundness of our argument generating
Πgs, we have |Pr[W2 = 1]− Pr[W3 = 1]| ≤ Pr[F1] ≤ AdvsoundΠgs (λ) = negl(λ).
Game 4: This game generates a simulated proof for the oracle Chal. The view
is indistinguishable to A by statistical zero-knowledge property of our argu-
ment system generating Πgs. Therefore we have Pr[W3 = 1] ≈ Pr[W4 = 1].
Game 5: This is the same as Game 4 except that c1 is now encryption of bin(i1)
while c2 is still encryption of bin(i0) for the Chal query. By the semantic
security of our encryption scheme for public key (B,P1) (which relies on LWE
assumption), this change is negligible to the adversary. Recall that we use
S2 for the Trace queries. So the change of c1 makes no difference to the view
of the adversary. Therefore we have |Pr[W4 = 1]− Pr[W5 = 1]| = negl(λ).
Game 6: This game follows Game 5 with one change: it switches back to use S1
for the Trace queries and discards (S2,E2). This modification is indistinguish-
able to the adversary until event F2, where A queries the trace oracle a valid
signature (M,Πgs, c1, c2, infoτ ) with c1, c2 encrypting different bit strings,
happens. However event F2 breaks the simulation soundness of the argument
system generating Πgs. Therefore we have |Pr[W5 = 1] − Pr[W6 = 1]| ≤
AdvssΠgs(λ) = negl(λ).
Game 7: In this game, it changes c2 to be encryption of bin(i1) for the Chal
query while the remaining parts are the same as in Game 6. By the semantic
security of our encryption scheme for public key (B,P2), this change is
negligible to the adversary. Note that we now use S1 for the Trace queries.
So changing c2 makes no difference to the view of the adversary. Therefore
we have |Pr[W6 = 1]− Pr[W7 = 1]| = negl(λ).
Game 8: We now generate real proof for the Chal query instead of simulated
proof. By the statistical zero-knowledge property of our argument system
generating Πgs, the view of the adversary in Game 7 and Game 8 are statis-
tically indistinguishable, i.e., we have Pr[W7 = 1] ≈ Pr[W8 = 1].
Game 9: This game produces real proof, for the Trace queries. By the statistical
zero-knowledge property of our argument system generating Πtrace, we have
Game 8 and Game 9 are statistically indistinguishable to the adversary,
i.e., we have Pr[W8 = 1] ≈ Pr[W9 = 1]. This is actually the experiment
Expanon−1FDGS,A(λ). Hence, we have Pr[W9 = 1] = Pr[Exp
anon−1
FDGS,A(λ) = 1].
As a result, we have that
|Pr[Expanon−1FDGS,A(λ) = 1]− Pr[Expanon−0FDGS,A(λ) = 1]| = negl(λ),
and hence our scheme is anonymous. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3. Assume that the SIS∞n,m,q,1 problem is hard. Then the given FDGS
scheme provides non-frameability in the random oracle model.
Proof. We prove non-frameability by contradiction. Suppose that A succeeds
with non-negligible advantage ǫ. Then we can build a PPT algorithm B that
either breaks the security of our accumulator or solves SIS∞n,q,m,1 problem, which
are featured by A, with also non-negligible probability.
Given a matrix A from the environment that B is in, it first generates all
parameters pp as we do in GSetup, then invokes A with pp, and then proceeds
as described in the experiment. Here B can consistently answer all the oracle
queries made by A. When A outputs (M∗, Σ∗, bin(j∗), Π∗trace, infoτ ) and wins, B
does following.
Parse Σ∗ as (Π∗gs, c
∗
1, c
∗
2), where Π
∗
gs = ({CMT∗i }κi=1,CH∗, {RSP∗i }κi=1) and
RSP∗i is a valid response w.r.t CMT
∗
i and CH
∗
i for i ∈ [κ] since A wins. We
claim that A queried the tuple (M∗, {CMT∗i }ki=1,A,uτ ,B,P1,P2, c∗1, c∗2), de-
noted as ξ∗, to the hash oracle HFS with overwhelming probability. Otherwise
guessing correctly this value occurs only with probability 3−κ, which is negli-
gible. Therefore, with probability ǫ′ = ǫ − 3−κ, the tuple ξ∗ has been an input
of one hash query, denoted as t∗ ∈ {1, 2 · · · , QH}, where QH is the total num-
ber of hash queries made by A. To employ the Forking lemma of Brickell et
al. [11], B runs polynomial-number executions of A exactly the same as in the
original run until the t∗ hash query, that is, from t∗ hash query on, B will answer
A with fresh and independent values for hash queries on each new execution.
Note that the input of t∗ hash query must be ξ∗ as in the original run. By
the Forking Lemma [11], with probability ≥ 12 , B obtains 3-fork involving the
same tuple ξ∗ with pairwise distinct hash value CH
(1)
t∗ ,CH
(2)
t∗ ,CH
(3)
t∗ ∈ {1, 2, 3}κ.
We have (CH
(1)
t∗,j ,CH
(2)
t∗,j,CH
(3)
t∗,j) = (1, 2, 3) with probability 1 − (79 )κ for some
j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , κ}. Then by the argument of knowledge of the system generat-
ing Πgs, from the valid responses (RSP
(1)
t∗,j ,RSP
(2)
t∗,j,RSP
(3)
t∗,j), we can extract the
witnesses ζ′ = (x′,p′, w′τ , r
′
1, r
′
2), where
w′τ = (bin(j
′),w′ℓ,τ , . . . ,w
′
1,τ ) ∈ {0, 1}ℓ × ({0, 1}nk)ℓ,
such that we have:
(i) TVerifyA(uτ ,p
′, w′τ ) = 1,p
′ 6= 0;
(ii) A · x′ =G · p′ mod q;
(iii) c∗1, c
∗
2 are encryptions of bin(j
′) with randomness r′1 and r
′
2.
By the correctness of our encryption scheme, c∗1 is decrypted to bin(j
′). The
fact A wins implies algorithm Judge outputs 1. By the soundness of our system
generating Πtrace, bin(j
∗) is decrypted from c∗1. Hence we have bin(j
′) = bin(j∗)
with overwhelming probability.
Now we consider the following two cases:
Case 1: bin(j′) is a inactive user at epoch τ , i.e., the value at leaf bin(j′) is 0nk.
This violates the accumulator security since we have TVerifyA(uτ ,p
′, w′τ ) = 1
with p′ 6= 0 at leaf bin(j′).
Case 2: bin(j∗) is an active user at epoch τ . The fact bin(j∗) ∈ HUL \ BUL
indicates A does not know gsk[j∗] = (bin(j∗),p′,xj∗), where xj∗ was initially
chosen by B and satisfies A · xj∗ =G ·p′ mod q. Following the same argument
of [30], we claim that xj∗ 6= x′ with probability at least 1/2. Then we find a
nonzero vector z = xj∗ − x′ satisfying Az = 0 mod q. Recall xj∗ ,x′ ∈ {0, 1}m.
Thus B solves a SIS∞n,q,m,1 problem with non-negligible probability if A breaks
the non-frameability of our construction with non-negligible probability. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4. Assume that the SIS∞n,m,q,1 problem is hard. Then the given FDGS
scheme satisfies traceability in the random oracle model.
Proof. Recall that adversary A wins traceability experiment if it generates a
valid signature that either: (i) traces to an inactive user; or (ii) traces to an
active user but we cannot generate a proof accepted by the algorithm Judge. We
will prove that both cases occur with negligible probability.
Let (infoτ ,M,Σ) be the output of A in the experiment ExptraceFDGS,A(λ) and we
compute (bin(j), Πtrace) by running the algorithm Trace . ParseΣ as (Πgs, c1, c2),
where Πgs = ({CMTi}κi=1,CH, {RSPi}κi=1), and RSPi is a valid response w.r.t.
CMTi and CHi for i ∈ [κ] since (infoτ ,M,Σ) is a valid signature outputted by A.
Now we are in the same situation as in Lemma 3. By the same technique, we can
extract witnesses ζ = (x,p, wτ , r1, r2), where wτ = (bin(j
′),wℓ,τ , . . . ,w1,τ ) ∈
{0, 1}ℓ × ({0, 1}nk)ℓ satisfying TVerify
A
(uτ ,p, wτ ) = 1, p 6= 0nk, and c1, c2 are
encryptions of bin(j′) using randomness r1 and r2. Correctness of our encryption
scheme implies c1 is decrypted to bin(j
′). Correct decryption of the Trace algo-
rithm, which is run by the challenger, indicates that bin(j) is decrypted from c1.
Hence we have bin(j′) = bin(j) with overwhelming probability.
Now, we note that case (i) considered above only happens with negligible
probability. In fact, if bin(j) is not active at epoch τ , and TVerifyA(uτ ,p, wτ ) = 1
with p 6= 0 at leaf bin(j), then the security of our accumulator is violated.
Furthermore, case (ii) also occurs with negligible probability since the challenger
possesses valid witnesses to generate the proof Πtrace, which will be accepted by
the Judge algorithm, thanks to the completeness of the underlying argument
system. It then follows that our scheme satisfies the traceability requirement.
⊓⊔
Lemma 5. The given FDGS scheme satisfies tracing soundness in the random
oracle model.
Proof. Let (M,Σ, bin(j0), Πtrace,0, bin(j1), Πtrace,1, infoτ ) be the output of the ad-
versary in the experiment Exptrace−soundFDGS,A (λ). Recall that adversary wins if the
following conditions hold:
(i) bin(j0) 6= bin(j1);
(ii) Verify(gpk, infoτ ,M,Σ) = 1;
(iii) Judge(gpk, bin(jb), infoτ , Πtrace,b,M,Σ) = 1 for b ∈ {0, 1};
(iv) bin(jb) 6= ⊥ for b ∈ {0, 1}.
Let us parse Πtrace,b as ({CMTi,b}κi=1,CHb, {RSPi,b}κi=1). The fact that the
Judge algorithm outputs 1 implies that RSPi,b is a valid response w.r.t. CMTi,b
and CHi,b for i ∈ [κ] and b ∈ {0, 1}. By using the extraction technique for
argument system generating Πtrace as in Lemma 3, we can extract the witnesses
S1,b,E1,b,yb for b ∈ {0, 1} satisfying:
‖S1,b‖∞ ≤ β; ‖E1,b‖∞ ≤ β; ‖yb‖∞ ≤ ⌈q/5⌉;
S⊤1,b ·B+E1,b = P1 mod q;
c1,2 − S⊤1,b · c1,1 = yb + ⌊q/2⌋ · bin(jb) mod q.
(6)
Note that, we have (S⊤1,0−S⊤1,1) ·c1,1 = y1−y0+⌊q/2⌋·(bin(j1)−bin(j0)) mod q.
Suppose that bin(j0) 6= bin(j1), then ‖⌊q/2⌋ · (bin(j1)− bin(j0))‖∞ = ⌊q/2⌋. On
the other hand, we have ‖y1 − y0‖∞ ≤ 2 · ⌈q/5⌉. It then follows that
‖y1 − y0 + ⌊q/2⌋ · (bin(j1)− bin(j0))‖∞ > 0,
which implies that S⊤1,0 6= S⊤1,1. In other words, we can obtain two solutions for
the equation S⊤ ·B+E = P1 mod q, which contradicts the fact that there exists
at most one solution for LWE samples (B,P1).
By contradiction, we have bin(j0) = bin(j1) with overwhelming probability.
This implies that case (i) does not hold with overwhelming probability once cases
(ii),(iii) and (iv) hold. As a result, the advantage of the adversary attacking
the tracing soundness of our scheme is negligible (in λ). In other words, our
construction satisfies tracing soundness. ⊓⊔
4.3 Details of the Main Zero-Knowledge Argument System
Our protocol is a modification of the one from [30], in which we additionally
prove that p 6= 0nk using the technique discussed at the beginning of Section 4.
We will employ a new strategy for Stern-like protocols, suggested in [28], which
consists of unifying all the equations to be proved into just one equation of the
form M · z = u mod q, for some public matrix M and vector u over Zq. This
strategy will help us to deliver a simpler presentation than in [30].
Let us first examine the equations associated with the execution of algorithm
TVerifyA
(
uτ ,p, ((j1, . . . , jℓ), (wℓ, . . . ,w1))
)
. This algorithm computes the tree
path vℓ,vℓ−1, . . . ,v1,v0 ∈ {0, 1}nk as follows: vℓ = p and
∀i ∈ {ℓ− 1, . . . , 1, 0} : vi =
{
hA(vi+1,wi+1), if ji+1 = 0;
hA(wi+1,vi+1), if ji+1 = 1.
(7)
The algorithm outputs 1 if v0 = uτ . Observe that relation (7) can be equivalently
rewritten as: ∀i ∈ {ℓ− 1, . . . , 1, 0},
j¯i+1 · hA(vi+1,wi+1) + ji+1 · hA(wi+1,vi+1) = vi
⇔ j¯i+1 ·
(
A0 · vi+1 +A1 ·wi+1
)
+ ji+1 ·
(
A0 ·wi+1 +A1 · vi+1
)
= G · vi mod q
⇔ A ·
(
j¯i+1 · vi+1
ji+1 · vi+1
)
+A ·
(
ji+1 ·wi+1
j¯i+1 ·wi+1
)
=G · vi mod q
⇔ A · ext(ji+1,vi+1) +A · ext(j¯i+1,wi+1) = G · vi mod q.
In the above, we use the notation ext(b,v), for bit b and vector v, to denote
the vector
(
b¯ · v
b · v
)
. Later on, we will also use the notation ext2(b), for bit b, to
denote the 2-dimensional vector (b¯, b)⊤.
Given the above discussion, our protocol can be summarized as follows.
Public input: A, G, uτ , B, P1, P2, c1 = (c1,1, c1,2), c2 = (c2,1, c2,2).
Prover’s goal: Proving knowledge of secret x ∈ {0, 1}m, 0 6= p ∈ {0, 1}nk,
j1, . . . , jℓ ∈ {0, 1}, v1, . . . ,vℓ−1,w1, . . . ,wℓ ∈ {0, 1}nk, r1, r2 ∈ {0, 1}mE ,
such that the following equations hold:
A · ext(j1,v1) +A · ext(j¯1,w1) = G · uτ mod q;
A · ext(j2,v2) +A · ext(j¯2,w2)−G · v1 = 0 mod q;
. . . . . . . . .
A · ext(jℓ,p) +A · ext(j¯ℓ,wℓ)−G · vℓ−1 = 0 mod q;
A · x −G · p = 0 mod q;
B · rb = cb,1 mod q, for b ∈ {1, 2};
Pb · rb +
⌊
q
2
⌉ · (j1, . . . , jℓ)⊤ = cb,2 mod q, for b ∈ {1, 2}.
(8)
Now, we employ extending-then-permuting techniques for Stern-like proto-
cols [49,35,30,28] to handle the secret objects, as follows. For any positive inte-
ger i, we let Si denote the set of all permutations of i elements.
– To prove that p ∈ {0, 1}nk and p 6= 0nk, we append nk−1 “dummy” entries
to p to get p∗ ∈ B2nk−1nk . Note that, for any πp ∈ S2nk−1, we have:
p∗ ∈ B2nk−1nk ⇔ πp(p∗) ∈ B2nk−1nk .
– To prove that x ∈ {0, 1}m, we append m “dummy” entries to x to get
x∗ ∈ B2mm . Note that, for any πx ∈ S2m, we have: x∗ ∈ B2mm ⇔ πx(x∗) ∈ B2mm .
– Similarly, we extend v1, . . . ,vℓ−1,w1, . . . ,wℓ to v
∗
1, . . . ,v
∗
ℓ−1,w
∗
1, . . . ,w
∗
ℓ ∈
B2nknk , respectively. We also extend r1, r2 to r
∗
1, r
∗
2 ∈ B2mEmE , respectively.
– For each i = 1, . . . , ℓ, to prove that the bit ji ∈ {0, 1} is involved in both
encryption layer and Merkle tree layer, we extend it to ji = ext2(ji). Then
we use the following permuting technique.
For bit b ∈ {0, 1}, we let Tb be the permutation that transforms vector
t = (t0, t1)
⊤ ∈ Z2 into vector Tb(t) = (tb, tb). Note that, for any bi ∈{0, 1}, we have: ji = ext2(ji) ⇔ Tbi(ji) = ext2(ji ⊕ bi), where ⊕ denotes
the addition modulo 2. Then, to prove knowledge of ji ∈ {0, 1}, we instead
prove knowledge of ji = ext2(ji), by sampling bi
$←− {0, 1} and showing the
verifier that the right-hand side of the equivalence holds. Here, the crucial
point is that bi acts as a “one-time pad” that perfectly hides ji. Furthermore,
to prove that ji appears in a different layer of the system, we will set up a
similar equivalence in that layer, and use the same bi at both places.
– Now, we have to handle the extended vectors appearing in the context after
the above extensions. They are v̂1 = ext(j1,v
∗
1), . . . , v̂ℓ−1 = ext(jℓ−1,v
∗
ℓ−1) ∈
{0, 1}4nk and ŵ1 = ext(j¯1,w∗1), . . . , ŵℓ = ext(j¯ℓ,w∗ℓ ) ∈ {0, 1}4nk, as well as
p̂ = ext(jℓ,p
∗) ∈ {0, 1}4nk−2. To prove that these vector are well-formed, we
will use the following permuting techniques.
Let r ∈ {2nk, 2nk−1}. For b ∈ {0, 1} and π ∈ Sr, we define the permutation
Fb,π that transforms t =
(
t0
t1
)
∈ Z2r consisting of 2 blocks of size r into
Fb,π(t) =
(
π(tb)
π(tb¯)
)
. Namely, Fb,π first rearranges the blocks of t according to
b (it keeps the arrangement of blocks if b = 0, or swaps them if b = 1), then it
permutes each block according to π. Note that, we have the following, for all
b1, . . . , bℓ ∈ {0, 1}, φv,1, . . . , φv,ℓ−1, φw,1, . . . , φw,ℓ ∈ S2nk, and πp ∈ S2nk−1:
∀i ∈ [ℓ− 1] : v̂i = ext(ji,v∗i ) ⇐⇒ Fbi,φv,i(v̂i) = ext(ji ⊕ bi, φv,i(v∗i ));
∀i ∈ [ℓ] : ŵi = ext(j¯i,w∗i ) ⇐⇒ Fbi,φw,i(ŵi) = ext(ji ⊕ bi, φw,i(w∗i ));
p̂ = ext(jℓ,p
∗) ⇐⇒ Fbℓ,πp(p̂) = ext(jℓ ⊕ bℓ, πp(p∗)).
Combining these permuting techniques with the ones described earlier, we
can prove that the considered extended vectors are well-formed, with respect
to the secret j1, . . . , jℓ,v
∗
1, . . . ,v
∗
ℓ−1,w
∗
1, . . . ,w
∗
ℓ ,p
∗.
Given the above transformations, we now unify all the secret objects into vector
z ∈ {0, 1}D, where D = 10nkℓ+ 2m+ 4mE + 2ℓ− 3, of the following form (we
abuse the notation of transposition):(
v∗1 ‖ v̂1 ‖ ŵ1 ‖ . . . ‖v∗ℓ−1‖ v̂ℓ−1 ‖ŵℓ−1 ‖p∗ ‖ p̂ ‖ŵℓ‖x∗ ‖r∗1 ‖r∗2 ‖j1‖ . . . ‖jℓ
)
. (9)
Then, we observe that, the equations in (8) can be equivalently combined into
one equation M · z = u mod q, where matrix M and vector u are built from the
public input.
Next, to apply the permuting techniques we have discussed above, let us
define VALID as the set of all vectors in {0, 1}D, that have the form (9), where
x∗ ∈ B2mm , r∗1, r∗2 ∈ B2mEmE , p∗ ∈ B2nk−1nk , v∗1, . . . ,v∗ℓ−1 ∈ B2nknk , and there exist
j1, . . . , jℓ ∈ {0, 1}, w∗1, . . . ,w∗ℓ ∈ B2nknk , such that:{
p̂ = ext(jℓ,p
∗), ∀i ∈ [ℓ] : ji = ext2(ji),
∀i ∈ [ℓ − 1] : v̂i = ext(ji,v∗i ), ∀i ∈ [ℓ] : ŵi = ext(j¯i,w∗i ).
It can be seen that our vector z belongs to this tailored set VALID. To prove
that z ∈ VALID using random permutations, let us determine how to permute
the coordinates of z. To this end, we first define the set:
S = {0, 1}ℓ × S2m × S2nk−1 × (S2mE )2 × (S2nk)2ℓ−1.
Then, ∀η= ((b1, . . . , bℓ), πx, πp, (πr,1, πr,2), (φv,1, . . . , φv,ℓ−1, φw,1, . . . , φw,ℓ))∈S,
we let Γη be the permutation that, when applying to vector t ∈ ZD whose blocks
are as in (9), it transforms those blocks as follows:
– For all i ∈ [ℓ− 1]: v∗i 7→ φv,i(v∗i ); v̂i 7→ Fbi,φv,i(v̂i).
– For all i ∈ [ℓ]: ŵi 7→ Fbi,φw,i(ŵi); ji 7→ Tbi(ji).
– p∗ 7→ πp(p∗); b̂ 7→ Fbℓ,πp(p̂).
– x∗ 7→ πx(x∗); r∗1 7→ πr,1(r∗1); r∗2 7→ πr,2(r∗2).
It now can be checked that we have the desired equivalence: For all η ∈ S,
z ∈ VALID ⇐⇒ Γη(z) ∈ VALID.
At this point, we can now run a simple Stern-like protocol to prove knowledge
of z ∈ VALID such that M · z = u mod q. The common input is the pair (M,u),
while the prover’s secret input is z. The interaction between prover P and verifier
V is described in Fig. 3. The protocol employs the string commitment scheme
COM from [24] that is statistically hiding and computationally binding if the
SIVP
O˜(n)
problem is hard.
1. Commitment: Prover samples rz
$
←− ZDq , η
$
←− S and randomness ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 for
COM. Then he sends CMT =
(
C1, C2, C3
)
to the verifier, where
C1 = COM(η,M · rz ; ρ1), C2 = COM(Γη(rz); ρ2), C3 = COM(Γη(z+ rz); ρ3).
2. Challenge: The verifier sends a challenge Ch
$
←− {1, 2, 3} to the prover.
3. Response: Depending on Ch, the prover sends RSP computed as follows:
– Ch = 1: Let tz = Γη(z), tr = Γη(rz), and RSP = (tz, tr, ρ2, ρ3).
– Ch = 2: Let η2 = η, z2 = z+ rz, and RSP = (η2, z2, ρ1, ρ3).
– Ch = 3: Let η3 = η, z3 = rz, and RSP = (η3, z3, ρ1, ρ2).
Verification: Receiving RSP, the verifier proceeds as follows:
– Ch = 1: Check that tz ∈ VALID and C2 = COM(tr; ρ2), C3 = COM(tz + tr; ρ3).
– Ch = 2: Check that C1 = COM(η2,M · z2 − u; ρ1), C3 = COM(Γη2(z2); ρ3).
– Ch = 3: Check that C1 = COM(η3,M · z3; ρ1), C2 = COM(Γη3(z3); ρ2).
In each case, the verifier outputs 1 if and only if all the conditions hold.
Fig. 3: Our Stern-like zero-knowledge argument of knowledge.
Theorem 2. Assume that the SIVP
O˜(n)
problem is hard. Then the protocol in
Fig. 3 is a statistical ZKAoK with perfect completeness, soundness error 2/3,
and communication cost O˜(D log q). Namely:
– There exists a polynomial-time simulator that, on input (M,u), outputs an
accepted transcript statistically close to that produced by the real prover.
– There exists a polynomial-time knowledge extractor that, on input a com-
mitment CMT and 3 valid responses (RSP1,RSP2,RSP3) to all 3 possible
values of the challenge Ch, outputs z′ ∈ VALID such that M · z′ = u mod q.
Given vector z′ outputted by the knowledge extractor, we can compute a tuple ζ′
satisfying the conditions described at the beginning of this subsection, simply by
“backtracking” the transformation steps we have done on the way. The protocol
has communication cost O˜((10nkℓ+ 2m+ 4mE + 2ℓ− 3) log q) = O˜(λ · ℓ) bits.
The proof of Theorem 2 employs standard simulation and extraction tech-
niques for Stern-like protocols [24,35,36,28] and is deferred to Appendix A.
4.4 Zero-Knowledge Argument of Correct Decryption
We now present the underlying ZKAoK used by the tracing manager to generate
Πtrace. The protocol allows the prover to prove knowledge of decryption keys
for the multi-bit version of Regev’s encryption scheme, as well as prove the
correctness of decryption. While the argument system in Section 4.3 deals only
with {0, 1} witness vectors, here, we have to handle secret vectors/matrices of
infinity norm larger than 1. To this end, we will employ the decomposition
technique from [35,28] to transform them to vectors with infinity norm 1. We
thus first recall this technique.
Decompositions. For any B ∈ Z+, define the number δB := ⌊log2 B⌋ + 1 =
⌈log2(B+1)⌉ and the sequence B1, . . . , BδB , where Bj = ⌊B+2
j−1
2j ⌋, ∀j ∈ [1, δB].
As observed in [35], the sequence satisfies
∑δB
j=1 Bj = B and any integer v ∈
[−B,B] can be decomposed into vector (v(1), . . . , v(δB))⊤ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}δB such
that
∑δB
j=1Bj · v(j) = v.
Next, for any positive integers m, B, we define the decomposition matrix:
Hm,B :=

B1 . . . BδB
B1 . . . BδB
. . .
B1 . . . BδB
 ∈ Zm×mδB .
It then follows that, any vector v ∈ [−B,B]m can be decomposed into vector
v ∈ {−1, 0, 1}mδB such that Hm,B · v = v.
Once we have obtained a transformed witness vector v ∈ {−1, 0, 1}mδB , we
then employ the usual extending-permuting technique for Stern-like protocols.
For any positive integer i, we let R3i be the set of all vectors in {−1, 0, 1}3i that
have exactly i coordinates equal to j, for each j ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. Note that this set
is “closed” under permutations, i.e., for any π ∈ S3i and any vector x ∈ R3i , the
following equivalence holds:
x ∈ R3i ⇔ π(x) ∈ R3i . (10)
The protocol is summarized as follows.
Public input: B ∈ Zn×mEq , P1 ∈ Zℓ×mEq , c1,1 ∈ Znq , c1,2 ∈ Zℓq, b′ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ.
Prover’s goal: Proving knowledge of S1 ∈ [−β, β]n×ℓ, E1 ∈ [−β, β]ℓ×mE , and
y ∈ [−⌈q/5⌉, ⌈q/5⌉]ℓ, such that:{
S⊤1 ·B+E1 = P1 mod q;
c1,2 − S⊤1 · c1,1 = y+ ⌊q/2⌋ · b′ mod q.
(11)
For each j ∈ [ℓ], let sj , ej ,pj be the j-th column of matrix S1,E⊤1 ,P⊤1 ,
respectively; and let yj , cj, bj be the j-th entry of vector y, c1,2,b
′, respectively.
Then observe that (11) can be re-written as:
∀j ∈ [ℓ] :
{
BT · sj + ImE · ej = pj mod q
cT1,1 · sj + 1 · yj = cj − bj · ⌊q/2⌋ mod q.
(12)
Using basic algebra, we can manipulate the equations in (12)by rearranging
the secret vectors and forming public matrices accordingly. As a result, we obtain
a unifying equation of the form
M0 · z0 = u mod q,
where M0, u are built from the public input while z0 = (z1‖z2), with{
z1 = (s1‖ · · · ‖sℓ‖e1‖ · · · ‖eℓ) ∈ [−β, β](n+mE)ℓ,
z2 = (y1, . . . , yℓ)
⊤ ∈ [⌈−q/5⌉, ⌈q/5⌉]ℓ.
Next, we can use the decomposition and extension techniques described above
to handle our secret vectors. First, decompose z1 into z1 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}D1 with
D1 = (n +mE)ℓδβ and z2 into z2 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}D2 with D2 = ℓδ⌈q/5⌉, and form
the secret vector z0 = (z1‖z2) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}L with D′ = D1+D2. Then extend z0
to z ∈ R3D′ . Using some basic algebra, we can form public matrix M such that
M · z =M0 · z0 = u mod q.
Now, define the tailored set VALID = R3D′ and let S = SD with D = 3D′.
For every η ∈ S, define Γη = η. It is checked that our secret vector z ∈ VALID.
Observe the equivalence in (10), for any η ∈ S, the following equivalence also
holds:
z ∈ VALID ⇐⇒ Γη(z) ∈ VALID.
At this point, we can see that the desired statistical ZKAoK protocol can be
obtained by running the interactive protocol described in Fig. 3.
5 Achieving Deniability with Ease
This section presents how to make our fully dynamic group signature scheme
deniable, in the sense of [22] and in a relatively simple manner. In Section 5.1, we
first incorporate Ishida et al.’s notion of deniability into Bootle et al.’s model [7].
Then, we show in Section 5.2 that a scheme satisfying this extended model
can be easily constructed based on the one from Section 4 and a zero-knowledge
argument of “denial opening”, demonstrating that a given Regev ciphertext does
not decrypt to a particular message. The zero-knowledge argument is described
in detail in Section 5.3.
5.1 Fully Dynamic Group Signatures with Deniability
We now extend Bootle et al.’s model of FDGS (in Section 2.2) to capture the
notion of deniability. Our extension follows Ishida et al.’s approach [22] when
they incorporate the deniability functionality into Sakai et al.’s model [47].
A fully dynamic group signature scheme with deniability (FDGSwD) consists
of all algorithms of an FDGS, as specified in Section 2.2, and two additional
algorithms: DTrace and DJudge.
DTrace(gpk, tsk, infoτ , reg, uid
′,M,Σ)→ ΠD(uid′). The denial opening algorithm,
run by the TM, returns a proof ΠD(uid′) showing that uid
′ did not compute
the signature Σ on the message M at time τ .
DJudge(gpk, uid, infoτ , ΠD(uid′),M,Σ)→ 0/1. The denial judgement algorithm
checks the validity of ΠD(uid′) outputted by the DTrace algorithm.
An FDGSwD scheme must satisfy correctness, anonymity, non-frameability,
traceability and tracing soundness. To formalize these requirements, we first spec-
ify an additional oracle, called DTrace.
DTrace(uid′,M,Σ, infoτ ). This oracle returns a denial opening proof ΠD(uid′). It
is required that Σ is not generated by the challenged oracle or the user uid′
is not in the challenged user set to eliminate the cases where the adversary
trivially breaks anonymity.
Then, the correctness and security requirements of an FDGSwD scheme are
defined by experiments ExpcorrFDGSwD,A(λ) and
Expanon−bFDGSwD,A(λ),Exp
non−frame
FDGSwD,A(λ),Exp
trace
FDGSwD,A(λ),Exp
trace−sound
FDGSwD,A (λ),
described in Fig. 4, 5, and 6. The differences between these requirements and
the original ones of Bootle et al.’s model (Section 2.2) are highlighted in the
below.
Correctness additionally requires that a (denial) proof generated by algorithm
DTrace, with respect to a message-signature pair (M,Σ) and an arbitrary user
uid′ who is not the real signer, is always accepted by algorithm DJudge.
Experiment: ExpcorrFDGSwD,A(λ)
pp ← GSetup(λ),HUL := ∅.
〈(info,mpk,msk); (tpk, tsk)〉 ← 〈GKgenGM(pp),GKgenTM(pp)〉.
Set gpk = (pp,mpk, tpk). (uid,M, τ )← AAddU,RReg,GUpdate(gpk, info).
If uid /∈ HUL or gsk[uid] = ⊥ or infoτ = ⊥ or IsActive(infoτ , reg, uid) = 0, return 0.
Σ ← Sign(gpk, gsk[uid], infoτ ,M), (uid
∗,ΠTrace)← Trace(gpk, tsk, infoτ , reg,M,Σ).
uid′ ← AAddU,RReg,Gupdate(Σ, uid∗,ΠTrace).
If uid′ = uid ∨ uid′ /∈ HUL, then return 0.
ΠD(uid′) ← DTrace(gpk, tsk, infoτ , reg, uid
′,M,Σ).
Return 1 if Verify(gpk, infoτ ,M,Σ) = 0 or uid 6= uid
∗ or
Judge(gpk, uid, infoτ ,ΠTrace,M,Σ) = 0 or DJudge(gpk, uid
′, infoτ ,ΠD(uid′)M,Σ) = 0.
Fig. 4: Experiment to define correctness for an FDGSwD scheme.
Anonymity is defined with respect to an adversary who also has access to the
additional oracle DTrace specified above.
Non-frameability additionally requires that it is infeasible for the adversary to
generate a valid signature whose denial opening proof with respect to an honest
user is not accepted by the DJudge algorithm.
Experiment: Expanon−bFDGSwD,A(λ)
pp ← GSetup(λ),HUL,CUL,BUL,CL,SL := ∅.
(stinit, info,mpk,msk)← A
〈·,GKgenTM〉(pp)(init : pp).
Return 0 if GKgenTM did not accept or A’s output is not well-formed.
Denote the output of GKgenTM as (tpk, tsk), and set gpk = (pp,mpk, tpk).
b∗ ← AAddU,CrptU,RevealU,SndToU,Trace,MReg,DTrace,Chalb (play : stinit, gpk).
Return b∗.
Experiment: Expnon−frame
FDGSwD,A(λ)
pp ← GSetup(λ),HUL,CUL,BUL,SL = ∅.
(stinit, info,mpk,msk, tpk, tsk)← A(init : pp).
Return 0 if A’s output is not well-formed, otherwise set gpk = (pp,mpk, tpk).
(M,Σ, uid, ΠTrace, infoτ )← A
CrptU,RevealU,SndToU,MReg,Sign(play : stinit, gpk).
ΠD(uid) ← DTrace(gpk, tsk, infoτ , reg, uid,M,Σ).
If Verify(gpk, infoτ ,M,Σ) = 0 or uid /∈ HUL \ BUL or (uid,M,Σ, τ ) ∈ SL, return 0.
Return 1 if Judge(gpk, uid, infoτ ,ΠTrace,M,Σ) = 1 or
DJudge(gpk, uid, infoτ ,ΠD(uid),M,Σ) = 0.
Fig. 5: Experiment to anonymity and non-frameability of an FDGSwD scheme.
Traceability additionally demands that the adversary is not able to produce a
valid signature such that opening proof is accepted by the Judge algorithm, but
the denial opening proof with respect to the same user is also accepted by the
DJudge algorithm.
Tracing Soundness also requires that the adversary should not be able to gen-
erate a valid signature such that the denial opening proof for the actual signer
is accepted by the DJudge algorithm.
Definition 6. Let λ be any security parameter and A be any PPT adversary.
For correctness, non-frameability, traceability and tracing soundness, the advan-
tage of the adversary is defined as the probability of outputting 1 in the corre-
sponding experiment. For anonymity, the advantage is defined as the absolute
difference of probability of outputting 1 between experiment Expanon−1FDGSwD,A and
experiment Expanon−0FDGSwD,A.
A fully dynamic group signature scheme with deniability is said to be correct
and secure (i.e., anonymous, non-frameable, traceable and tracing sound) if the
advantages of the adversary in all considered experiments are negligible in λ.
5.2 Our Construction
As shown by Ishida et al. [22], the main difficulty towards realizing the deniability
functionality is to prove in zero-knowledge that a given ciphertext does not
decrypt to a particular message. Such a mechanism is non-trivial to realize in
general, but it can be done quite easily for our scheme by using the Stern-like
technique for proving inequality. Let us look at the equation
c1,2 − S⊤1 · c1,1 = y+ ⌊q/2⌋ · b′ mod q,
Experiment: ExptraceFDGSwD,A(λ)
pp ← GSetup(λ),HUL,CUL,BUL,SL = ∅.
(stinit, tpk, tsk)← A
〈GKgenGM(pp),·〉(init : pp).
Return 0 if GKgenGM did not accept or A’s output is not well-formed.
Denote the output of GKgenGM as (mpk,msk, info), and set gpk = (pp,mpk, tpk).
(M,Σ, τ )← AAddU,CrptU,SndToGM,RevealU,MReg,Sign,GUpdate (play : stinit, gpk, info).
If Verify(gpk, infoτ ,M,Σ) = 0, return 0.
(uid,ΠTrace)← Trace(gpk, tsk, infoτ , reg,M,Σ).
ΠD(uid) ← A
AddU,CrptU,SndToGM,RevealU,MReg,Sign,GUpdate (play : stinit, uid,ΠTrace).
Return 1 if IsActive(infoτ , reg, uid) = 0 or uid = ⊥ or
Judge(gpk, uid, infoτ ,ΠTrace,M,Σ) = 0 or DJudge(gpk, uid, infoτ ,ΠD(uid),M,Σ) = 1.
Experiment: Exptrace−soundFDGSwD,A (λ)
pp ← GSetup(λ),CUL = ∅. (stinit, info,mpk,msk, tpk, tsk)← A(init : pp).
Return 0 if A’s output is not well-formed, otherwise set gpk = (pp,mpk, tpk).
(M,Σ, uid0,ΠTrace,0, ΠD(uid0), uid1,ΠTrace,1, infoτ )← A
CrptU,MReg(play : stinit, gpk).
If Verify(gpk, infoτ ,M,Σ) = 0 ∨ Judge(gpk, uid0, infoτ ,ΠTrace,0,M,Σ) = 0, return 0.
Return 1 if {uid0 ( 6= ⊥) 6= uid1 ( 6= ⊥) ∧ Judge(gpk, uid1, infoτ ,ΠTrace,1,M,Σ) = 1} ∨
DJudge(gpk, uid0, infoτ ,ΠD(uid0),M,Σ) = 1.
Fig. 6: Experiments to define traceability and tracing soundness of an FDGSwD
scheme.
that appears in the argument of correct decryption from Section 4.4. To realize
deniability, the plaintext b′ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ should be hidden, and we have to prove
that b′ 6= uid′, for some given uid′ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ. Subtracting both sides of the
equation by ⌊q/2⌋ · uid′, we get the following:
c1,2 − S⊤1 · c1,1 − ⌊q/2⌋ · uid′ = y+ ⌊q/2⌋ · b mod q,
where b = b′ − uid′ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}ℓ is non-zero. Therefore, the problem towards
realizing the deniability is reduced to proving knowledge of a non-zero vector
b ∈ {−1, 0, 1}ℓ. This can be done by just appending 2ℓ−1 “dummy” entries to b
and randomly permuting the extended vector. We defer the detailed description
to Section 5.3.
Now, let us describe and analyze our fully dynamic group signature scheme
with deniability. Besides all the algorithms specified in Section 4.1, the scheme
contains two additional algorithms, DTrace and DJudge, as follows.
DTrace(gpk, tsk, infoτ , reg, uid
′,M,Σ). Let b′ be the decryption result of the
Trace algorithm, denote b = b′ − uid′. This algorithm generates a NIZKAoK
to demonstrate the possession of S1 ∈ Zn×ℓ,E1 ∈ Zℓ×mE ,y ∈ Zℓ, and non-
zero vector b ∈ {−1, 0, 1}ℓ such that
‖S1‖∞ ≤ β; ‖E1‖∞ ≤ β; ‖y‖∞ ≤ ⌈q/5⌉;
S⊤1 ·B+E1 = P1 mod q;
c1,2 − S⊤1 · c1,1 − ⌊q/2⌋ · uid′ = y+ ⌊q/2⌋ · b mod q.
(13)
The detailed description of the protocol is presented in Section 5.3. The
protocol is repeated κ = ω(logλ) times to achieve negligible soundness error
and made non-interactive via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic as a triple ΠD(uid′) =
({CMTi}κi=1,CH, {RSP}κi=1), where
CH = HFS
({CMTi}κi=1, gpk, infoτ ,M,Σ, uid′) ∈ {1, 2, 3}κ. (14)
DJudge(gpk, uid′, infoτ , ΠD(uid′),M,Σ). If Verify algorithm outputs 0, then this
algorithm returns 0. Otherwise, this algorithm then verifies the argument
ΠD(uid′) with respect to common input (gpk, infoτ ,M,Σ, uid
′), in a similar
manner as in algorithm Verify.
If ΠD(uid′) does not verify, return 0. Otherwise, return 1.
Efficiency. In comparison with the FDGS scheme analyzed in Section 4.2, the
extended scheme additionally features the NIZKAoK ΠD(uid′), which is of bit-size
O˜(ℓ2 + λ · ℓ). (Recall that λ is the security parameter while ℓ = logN .)
Correctness. The correctness of the scheme is analyzed as in Section 4.2,
but here we additionally need to prove that algorithm DJudge will accept the
proof ΠD(uid′) for uid
′ that is not the real signer. Since the tracing manager can
correctly identify the signer, he possesses a valid tuple (S1,E1,y,b) such that the
conditions in (13) hold. Correctness then follows from the perfect completeness
of our argument system generating ΠD(uid′).
Anonymity. It is analyzed as in Lemma 2, except that the challenger addition-
ally needs to answer the DTrace oracle queries. However, this can be done in the
same way it answers the Trace oracle queries. In other words, when the chal-
lenger replies with real proof Πtrace, it also replies with real proof ΠD(·); when
the challenger replies with simulated proof Πtrace, it also replies with simulated
proof ΠD(·). This minor change does not affect anonymity, since the argument
system generating ΠD(·) is statistically zero-knowledge.
Non-frameability. We prove non-frameability by contradiction. Suppose that
the non-frameability adversaryA succeeds with non-negligible advantage ǫ. Then
we build a PPT algorithm B that, with non-negligible probability, either breaks
the security of our accumulator or solves SIS∞n,q,m,1 problem associated with
matrix A.
Given a matrix A from the environment that B is in, it first generates all
parameters pp as we do in GSetup, then invokes A with pp, and then proceeds as
described in the experiment Expnon−frameFDGSwD,A(λ). Here B can consistently answer all
the oracle queries made by A. When A outputs (M∗, Σ∗, bin(j∗), Π∗trace, infoτ )
and wins, B then proceeds as in Lemma 3 until B extracts the witness ζ′ =
(· · · , bin(j′), · · · ). By the correctness of our encryption scheme, c∗1 is decrypted
to bin(j′), meaning bin(j′) is the actual signer of Σ∗. The fact thatA wins implies
either case (i) Judge(gpk, bin(j∗), infoτ , Π
∗
trace,M
∗, Σ∗) = 1 or case (ii)
DJudge(gpk, bin(j∗), infoτ , ΠD(bin(j∗)),M
∗, Σ∗) = 0.
Recall that bin(j∗) is the framed user outputted by the adversary. We claim that
bin(j′) = bin(j∗) in both case (i) and case (ii). Lemma 3 proves that the equality
holds in case (i). Now we prove it also holds in case (ii). Otherwise, bin(j′) 6=
bin(j∗), i.e., ΠD(bin(j∗)) is a denial proof for user bin(j
∗), who is not the actual
signer bin(j′) of Σ∗. Therefore, by the completeness of the underlying argument
system, ΠD(bin(j∗)) will be accepted by the DJudge algorithm, a contradiction of
case (ii). Hence, the equality holds in case (ii). To this point, B proceeds again as
in Lemma 3. In the end, B either breaks the security of our accumulator or solves
a SIS∞n,m,q,1 instance. Therefore, our FDGSwD scheme satisfies non-frameability.
Traceability. Except for the analysis of Lemma 4, we need to consider an
additional case (iii) in which A wins and prove that this case happens with
negligible probability. Case (iii) is the event that A outputs (infoτ ,M,Σ), where
Σ = (Πgs, c1, c2) is a valid signature; the (honestly generated) opening result is
(bin(j), Πtrace), where bin(j) is an active user and Πtrace is accepted by the Judge
algorithm; and then A outputs a denial proof ΠD(bin(j)), which is accepted by
the DJudge algorithm, after seeing the opening result.
To prove this case happens with negligible probability, we proceed as in
Lemma 4 and obtain that bin(j′) = bin(j) with overwhelming probability, where
bin(j′) is part of the extracted witness, meaning c1, c2 are encryptions of bin(j
′).
The assumption thatΠD(bin(j)) will be accepted by the DJudge algorithm implies
that bin(j′)− bin(j) 6= 0 with overwhelming probability, by the soundness of the
underlying argument system generating ΠD(·). This results in a contradiction.
Therefore, case (iii) only happens with negligible probability, which implies that
our FDGSwD scheme is traceable.
Tracing soundness. Except for the analysis of Lemma 5, we need to addi-
tionally show that it is infeasible for the adversary to generate a valid signature
together with a denial proof (for the actual signer) that is accepted by the
DJudge algorithm. In other words, we need to prove the event, when A outputs
(M,Σ, uid0, Πtrace,0, ΠD(uid0), uid1, Πtrace,1, infoτ ), both Πtrace,0 and ΠD(uid0) are
accepted, happens with negligible probability. Parse Σ as (Πgs, (c1,1, c1,2), c2).
Since Πtrace,0 is a valid opening proof, as in Lemma 5, we can extract witness
S1,E1,y such that S
⊤
1 ·B+E1 = P1 mod q and
c1,2 − S⊤1 · c1,1 = y+ ⌊q/2⌋ · uid0 mod q. (15)
The fact that ΠD(uid0) is accepted by the DJudge algorithm implies decryption
of (c1,1, c1,2) is not equal to uid0, due to the soundness of the underlying argu-
ment system. However, from equation (15), we know decryption of (c1,1, c1,2) is
uid0, by correctness of our encryption scheme. This results in a contradiction.
Therefore, the considered event occurs only with negligible probability, and the
FDGSwD scheme is tracing sound.
5.3 Zero-Knowledge Argument of “Denial Opening”
We now present the underlying ZKAoK used by the tracing manager to generate
ΠD(·). The protocol allows the prover to show that a given ciphertext does not
decrypt to a particular plaintext. The only difference of this protocol with the
one described in Section 4.4 is that we need to additionally prove knowledge of a
non-zero vector b ∈ {−1, 0, 1}ℓ. To this end, we will use the following extending-
permuting technique for Stern-like protocols, which is developed based on Ling
et al.’s idea [35].
For any integerm ∈ Z+, define R˜3m to be the set of all vectors in {−1, 0, 1}3m−1
that has m coordinates equal to −1 and 1, and m − 1 coordinates equal to 0.
To prove that b ∈ {−1, 0, 1}ℓ and b 6= 0ℓ, we append 2ℓ − 1 “dummy” entries
to b to obtain b∗ ∈ R˜3ℓ . Observe that b ∈ {−1, 0, 1}ℓ is non-zero if and only
if the extended vector b∗ ∈ R˜3ℓ . Furthermore, for any πb ∈ S3ℓ−1, the following
equivalence holds:
b∗ ∈ R˜3ℓ ⇔ πb(b∗) ∈ R˜3ℓ .
Now, by using the same technique described in Section 4.4, we can unify
equations in (13) into
M˜ · z˜ = u˜ mod q,
where M˜ and u˜ are built from public input while z˜ = (z‖b∗) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}D˜,
where z ∈ R3D′ as defined in Section 4.4, b∗ ∈ R˜3ℓ , and D˜ = D + 3ℓ− 1.
Define V˜ALID = R3D′ × R˜3ℓ and S˜ = SD × S3ℓ−1. For every η˜ = (η, πb) ∈ S˜,
define Γ
η˜
= η˜. It can be seen that our secret vector z˜ belongs to this tailed set
V˜ALID and the following equivalence holds:
z˜ ∈ V˜ALID ⇐⇒ Γ
η˜
(z˜) ∈ V˜ALID,
for any η˜ ∈ S˜. At this point, we can see that the desired statistical ZKAoK
protocol can be obtained from the one in Fig. 3.
We remark that the above technique for obtaining zero-knowledge argument
of “denial opening” is also applicable for several other existing lattice-based
group signatures [36,30,28] which employ similar tracing mechanisms as ours.
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A Proof of Theorem 2
We first restate Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. The protocol in Fig. 3 is a statistical ZKAoK with perfect com-
pleteness, soundness error 2/3, and communication cost O˜(D log q). Namely:
– There exists a polynomial-time simulator that, on input (M,u), outputs an
accepted transcript statistically close to that produced by the real prover.
– There exists a polynomial-time knowledge extractor that, on input a com-
mitment CMT and 3 valid responses (RSP1,RSP2,RSP3) to all 3 possible
values of the challenge Ch, outputs z′ ∈ VALID such that M · z′ = u mod q.
Proof. It can be checked that the protocol has perfect completeness: If an honest
prover follows the protocol, then he always gets accepted by the verifier. It is
also easy to see that the communication cost is bounded by O˜(D log q).
Zero-Knowledge Property. We construct a PPT simulator SIM interacting
with a (possibly dishonest) verifier V̂ , such that, given only the public input, SIM
outputs with probability negligibly close to 2/3 a simulated transcript that is
statistically close to the one produced by the honest prover in the real interaction.
The simulator first chooses a random Ch ∈ {1, 2, 3} as a prediction of the
challenge value that V̂ will not choose.
Case Ch = 1: Using basic linear algebra over Zq, SIM computes a vector z
′ ∈ ZDq
such that M · z′ = u mod q. Next, it samples rz $←− ZDq , η $←− S, and randomness
ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 for COM. Then, it sends CMT =
(
C′1, C
′
2, C
′
3
)
to V̂ , where
C′1 = COM(η,M · rz ; ρ1),
C′2 = COM(Γη(rz); ρ2), C
′
3 = COM(Γη(z
′ + rz); ρ3).
Receiving a challenge Ch from V̂, the simulator responds as follows:
– If Ch = 1: Output ⊥ and abort.
– If Ch = 2: Send RSP =
(
η, z′ + rz , ρ1, ρ3
)
.
– If Ch = 3: Send RSP =
(
η, rz, ρ1, ρ2
)
.
Case Ch = 2: SIM samples z′
$←− VALID, rz $←− ZDq , η $←− S, and randomness
ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 for COM. Then it sends CMT =
(
C′1, C
′
2, C
′
3
)
to V̂ , where
C′1 = COM(η,M · rz ; ρ1),
C′2 = COM(Γη(rz); ρ2), C
′
3 = COM(Γη(z
′ + rz); ρ3).
Receiving a challenge Ch from V̂, the simulator responds as follows:
– If Ch = 1: Send RSP =
(
Γη(z
′), Γη(rz), ρ2, ρ3
)
.
– If Ch = 2: Output ⊥ and abort.
– If Ch = 3: Send RSP =
(
η, rz, ρ1, ρ2
)
.
Case Ch = 3: SIM samples z′
$←− VALID, rz $←− ZDq , η $←− S, and random-
ness ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 for COM. Then it sends CMT =
(
C′1, C
′
2, C
′
3
)
to V̂ , where C′2 =
COM(Γη(rz); ρ2), C
′
3 = COM(Γη(z
′+ rz); ρ3) as in the previous two cases, while
C′1 = COM(η,M · (z′ + rz)− u; ρ1).
Receiving a challenge Ch from V̂, it responds as follows:
– If Ch = 1: Send RSP computed as in the case (Ch = 2, Ch = 1).
– If Ch = 2: Send RSP computed as in the case (Ch = 1, Ch = 2).
– If Ch = 3: Output ⊥ and abort.
We observe that, in every case, since COM is statistically hiding, the distribution
of the commitment CMT and the distribution of the challenge Ch from V̂ are
statistically close to those in the real interaction. Hence, the probability that
the simulator outputs ⊥ is negligibly close to 1/3. Moreover, one can check that
whenever the simulator does not halt, it will provide an accepted transcript,
the distribution of which is statistically close to that of the prover in the real
interaction. In other words, we have constructed a simulator that can successfully
impersonate the honest prover with probability negligibly close to 2/3.
Argument of Knowledge. Suppose that RSP1 = (tz, tr, ρ2, ρ3), RSP2 =
(η2, z2, ρ1, ρ3), RSP3 = (η3, z3, ρ1, ρ2) are 3 valid responses to the same commit-
ment CMT = (C1, C2, C3), with respect to all 3 possible values of the challenge.
The validity of these responses implies that:
tz ∈ VALID; C1 = COM(η2,M · z2 − u; ρ1) = COM(η3,M · z3; ρ1);
C2 = COM(tr; ρ2) = COM(Γη3(z3); ρ2);
C3 = COM(tz + tr; ρ3) = COM(Γη2(z2); ρ3).
Since COM is computationally binding, we can deduce that:{
tz ∈ VALID; η2 = η3; tr = Γη3(z3); tz + tr = Γη2(z2) mod q;
M · z2 − u =M · z3 mod q.
Since tz ∈ VALID, if we let z′ = [Γη2 ]−1(tz), then z′ ∈ VALID. Furthermore, we
have
Γη2(z
′) + Γη2(z3) = Γφ2(z2) mod q,
which implies that z′+ z3 = z2 mod q, and that M · z′+M · z3 =M · z2 mod q.
As a result, we have M · z′ = u mod q. This concludes the proof.
⊓⊔
